Monday, December 14, 2020

Of Human Bondage by W. Somerset Maugham

This long, philosophical novel is considered by many Maugham’s masterpiece, including by one of my high school English teachers, who assigned it to me and my class in our senior year. I think I was too dim to appreciate its depth at that tender age. Like it must have been for its author, Of Human Bondage can be a revelatory experience for those of middle age, and a cryptic puzzle for those without the required life experience.

Philip Carey is the protagonist of the story, which spans from his birth to his early middle age, and he is clearly a doppelganger for Maugham himself. The first several hundred pages are about his rise out of his obscure and blinkered upbringing (orphaned as a very small boy and sent to live with an older uncle, a vicar in the countryside outside of London), and his struggle to piece together his own understanding of the world and his own philosophy for making his way in it.

Here are two extended passages that will give you a flavor of this early part of the novel.

The Journey of the Atheist

As a young man, first emerging from his uncle’s shadow, Philip attends an international medical school in Germany, where he is exposed to many new ideas. Two early influencers on his thinking are classmates named Hayward and Weeks.

It occurred neither to Hayward nor to Weeks that the conversations which helped them pass an idle evening were being turned over afterwards in Philip’s active brain. It had never struck him before that religion was a matter upon which discussion was possible. To him it meant the Church of England, and not to believe in its tenets was a sign of wilfulness which could not fail of punishment here or hereafter.

Remember that Philip was raised in a religious and somewhat cold environment. He has had no outlet for whatever doubts it is normal for a growing intellect to feel.

There was some doubt in his mind about the chastisement of unbelievers. It was possible that a merciful judge, reserving the flames of hell for the heathen -- Mahommedans, Buddhists, and the rest -- would spare Dissenters and Roman Catholics (though at the cost of how much humiliation when they were made to realize their error!), and it was also possible that He would be pitiful to those who had had no chance of learning the truth -- this was reasonable enough, though such were the activities of the Missionary Society there could not be many in this condition -- but if the chance had been theirs and they had neglected it (in which category were obviously Roman Catholics and Dissenters), the punishment was sure and merited. It was clear that the miscreant was in a parlous state. Perhaps Philip had not been taught it in so many words, but certainly the impression had been given him that only members of the Church of England had any real hope of eternal happiness.

But now he is out in the world, meeting people of different faiths and upbringings, and he is experiencing some cognitive dissonance.

One of the things that Philip had heard definitely stated was that the unbeliever was a wicked and a vicious man; but Weeks, though he believed in hardly anything that Philip believed, led a life of Christian purity. Philip had received little kindness in his life, and he was touched by the American’s desire to help him: once when a cold kept him in bed for three days, Weeks nursed him like a mother. There was neither vice nor wickedness in him, but only sincerity and loving-kindness. It was evidently possible to be virtuous and unbelieving.

This, frequently, is the first substantial crack in an inherited religious view of the world: that those who don’t follow your religion are also good people. The second can come quickly after that: the understanding that religion is an inherited framework, not a reasoned conclusion.

Also Philip had been given to understand that people adhered to other faiths only from obstinacy or self-interest: in their hearts they knew they were false; they deliberately sought to deceive others. Now, for the sake of his German he had been accustomed on Sunday mornings to attend the Lutheran service, but when Hayward arrived he began instead to go with him to Mass. He noticed that, whereas the protestant church was nearly empty and the congregation had a listless air, the Jesuit on the other hand was crowded and the worshippers seemed to pray with all their hearts. They had not the look of hypocrites. He was surprised at the contrast; for he knew of course that the Lutherans, whose faith was closer to that of the Church of England, on that account were nearer to the truth than the Roman Catholics. Most of the men -- it was largely a masculine congregation -- were South Germans; and he could not help saying to himself that if he had been born in South Germany he would certainly have been a Roman Catholic. He might just as well have been born in a Roman Catholic country as in England; and in England as well in a Wesleyan, Baptist, or Methodist family as in one that fortunately belonged to the church by law established. He was a little breathless at the danger he had run. Philip was on friendly terms with the little Chinaman who sat at table with him twice each day. His name was Sung. He was always smiling, affable, and polite. It seemed strange that he should frizzle in hell merely because he was a Chinaman; but if salvation was possible whatever a man’s faith was, there did not seem to be any particular advantage in belonging to the Church of England.

Philip, more puzzled than he had ever been in his life, sounded Weeks. He had to be careful, for he was very sensitive to ridicule; and the acidulous humour with which the American treated the Church of England disconcerted him. Weeks only puzzled him more. He made Philip acknowledge that those South Germans whom he saw in the Jesuit church were every bit as firmly convinced of the truth of Roman Catholicism as he was of that of the Church of England, and from that he led him to admit that the Mahommedan and the Buddhist were convinced also of the truth of their respective religions. It looked as though knowing that you were right meant nothing; they all knew they were right. Weeks had no intention of undermining the boy’s faith, but he was deeply interested in religion, and found it an absorbing topic of conversation. He had described his own views accurately when he said that he very earnestly disbelieved in almost everything that other people believed. Once Philip asked him a question, which he had heard his uncle put when the conversation at the vicarage had fallen upon some mildly rationalistic work which was then exciting discussion in the newspapers.

‘But why should you be right and all those fellows like St Anselm and St Augustine be wrong?’

‘You mean that they were clever and learned men, while you have grave doubts whether I am either?’ asked Weeks.

‘Yes,’ answered Philip uncertainly, for put in that way his question seemed impertinent.

‘St. Augustine believed that the earth was flat and that the sun turned around it.’

‘I don’t know what that proves.’

‘Why, it proves that you believe with your generation. Your saints lived in an age of faith, when it was practically impossible to disbelieve what to us is positively incredible.’

‘Then how d’you know that we have the truth now?’

‘I don’t.’

Philip thought this over for a moment, then he said:

‘I don’t see why the things we believe absolutely now shouldn’t be just as wrong as what they believed in the past.’

‘Neither do I.’

‘Then how can you believe anything at all?’

‘I don’t know.’

And now comes the idea of relative truth, the sense that what we know goes only as deep as our ability to perceive it. ‘I don’t know’ is the secure haven of the unbeliever; the frightening precipice of the faithful. Be careful, Philip. The footing here is loose.

Philip asked Weeks what he thought of Hayward’s religion.

‘Men have always formed gods in their own image,’ said Weeks. ‘He believes in the picturesque.’

Philip paused for a little while, then he said:

‘I don’t see why one should believe in God at all.’

The words were no sooner out of his mouth than he realized that he had ceased to do so. It took his breath away like a plunge into cold water. He looked at Weeks with startled eyes. Suddenly he felt afraid. He left Weeks as quickly as he could. He wanted to be alone. It was the most startling experience that he had ever had. He tried to think it all out; it was very exciting, since his whole life seemed concerned (he thought his decision on this matter must profoundly affect its course) and a mistake might lead to eternal damnation; but the more he reflected the more convinced he was; and though during the next few weeks he read books, aids to scepticism, with eager interest it was only to confirm him in what he felt instinctively.

It is often like this. The words themselves -- spoken aloud for the first time -- give the idea its power, its essential understanding swamping the indoctrinated fears and trepidations of the unbeliever.

The fact was that he had ceased to believe not for this reason or the other, but because he had not the religious temperament. Faith had been forced upon him from the outside. It was a matter of environment and example. A new environment and a new example gave him the opportunity to find himself. He put off the faith of his childhood quite simply, like a cloak that he no longer needed. At first life seemed strange and lonely without the belief which, though he never realized it, had been an unfailing support. He felt like a man who has leaned on a stick and finds himself forced suddenly to walk without assistance. It really seemed as though the days were colder and the nights more solitary. But he was upheld by the excitement; it seemed to make life a more thrilling adventure; and in a little while the stick had been thrown aside, the cloak which had fallen from his shoulders, seemed an intolerable burden of which he had been eased. The religious exercises which for so many years had been forced upon him were part and parcel of religion to him. He thought of the collects and epistles which he had been made to learn by heart, and the long services in the Cathedral through which he had sat when every limb itched with desire for movement; and he remembered those walks at night through muddy roads to the parish church at Blackstable, and the coldness of that bleak building; he sat with his feet like ice, his fingers numb and heavy, and all around him the sickly smell of pomatum. Oh, he had been so bored! His heart leaped when he saw he was free from all that.

He was surprised at himself because he ceased to believe so easily, and, not knowing that he felt as he did on account of the subtle workings of his inmost nature, he ascribed the certainty he had reached to his own cleverness. He was unduly pleased with himself. With youth’s lack of sympathy for an attitude other than its own he despised not a little Weeks and Hayward because they were content with the vague emotion which they called God and would not take the further step which to himself seemed so obvious. One day he went alone up a certain hill so that he might see a view which, he knew not why, filled him always with wild exhilaration. It was autumn now, but often the days were cloudless still, and then the sky seemed to glow with a more splendid light: it was as though nature consciously sought to put a fuller vehemence into the remaining days of fair weather. He looked down upon the plain, a-quiver with the sun, stretching vastly before him: in the distance were the roofs of Mannheim and ever so far away the dimness of Worms. Here and there a more piercing glitter was the Rhine. The tremendous spaciousness of it was glowing with rich gold. Philip, as he stood there, his heart beating with sheer joy, thought how the tempter had stood with Jesus on a high mountain and shown him the kingdoms of the earth. To Philip, intoxicated with the beauty of the scene, it seemed that it was the whole world which was spread before him, and he was eager to step down and enjoy it. He was free from degrading fears and free from prejudice. He could do his way without the intolerable dread of hell-fire. Suddenly he realized that he had lost also that burden of responsibility which made every action of his life a matter of urgent consequence. He could breathe more freely in a lighter air. He was responsible only to himself for the things he did. Freedom! He was his own master at last. From old habit, unconsciously he thanked God that he no longer believed in Him.

Yes. It can be exhilarating. But after that first heady rush, life often goes back pretty much to what it was before.

Drunk with pride in his intelligence and in his fearlessness, Philip entered deliberately upon a new life. But his loss of faith made less difference in his behaviour than he expected. Though he had thrown on one side the Christian dogmas it never occurred to him to criticize the Christian ethics; he accepted the Chirstian virtues, and indeed thought it fine to practise them for their own sake, without a thought of reward or punishment. There was small occasion for heroism in the Frau Professor’s house, but he was a little more exactly truthful than he had been, and he forced himself to be more than commonly attentive to the dull, elderly ladies who sometimes engaged him in conversation. The gentle oath, the violent adjective, which are typical of our language and which he had cultivated before as a sign of manliness, he now elaborately eschewed.

And one is not always as free as one might think. Belief or non-belief, it seems; neither one absolves the agent from his dark and inscrutable fate.

Having settled the whole matter to his satisfaction he sought to put it out of his mind, but that was morely easily said than done; and he could not prevent the regrets nor stifle the misgivings which sometimes tormented him. He was so young and had so few friends that immortality had no particular attractions for him, and he was able without trouble to give up belief in it; but there was one thing which made him wretched; he told himself that he was unreasonable, he tried to laugh himself out of such pathos; but the tears really came to his eyes when he thought that he would never see again the beautiful mother whose love for him had grown more precious as the years since her death passed on. And sometimes, as though the influence of innumerable ancestors, God-fearing and devout, were working in him unconsciously, there seized him a panic fear that perhaps after all it was all true, and there was, up there behind the blue sky, a jealous God who would punish in everlasting flames the atheist. At these times his reason could offer him no help, he imagined the anguish of a physical torment which would last endlessly, he felt quite sick with fear and burst into a violent sweat. At last he would say to himself desperately:

‘After all, it’s not my fault. I can’t force myself to believe. If there is a God after all and He punishes me because I honestly don’t believe in Him I can’t help.’

This is the journey of the atheist, from start to finish, in Maugham’s marvelous prose. It is one of the many treasures of introspective purity that exists in this remarkable novel.

The Inevitable Selfishness of Humanity

A second extended passage that helps illustrate the philosophical nature of the novel occurs after Philip moves to Paris in order to study art. In Paris he will meet many characters that represent philosophical archetypes for his consideration and possible use. One of these is a nihilistic poet named Cronshaw.

‘But pray tell me [,’ Cronshaw said, ‘] what is the meaning of life?’

‘I say [,’ Philip replied, ‘] that’s rather a difficult question. Won’t you give the answer yourself?’

‘No, because it’s worthless unless you yourself discover it. But what do you suppose you are in the world for?’

Philip had never asked himself, and he thought for a moment before replying:

‘Oh, I don’t know: I suppose to do one’s duty, and make the best possible use of one’s faculties, and avoid hurting other people.’

‘In short, to do unto others as you would they should do unto you?’

‘I suppose so.’

‘Christianity.’

‘No, it isn’t,’ said Philip indignantly. ‘It has nothing to do with Christianity. It’s just abstract morality.’

‘But there’s no such thing as abstract morality.’

‘In that case, supposing under the influence of liquor you left your purse behind when you leave here and I picked it up, why do you imagine that I should return it to you? It’s not the fear of the police.’

‘It’s the dread of hell if you sin and the hope of Heaven if you are virtuous.’

‘But I believe in neither.’

‘That may be. Neither did Kant when he devised the Categorical Imperative. You have thrown aside a creed, but you have preserved the ethic which was based upon it. To all intents you are a Christian still, and if there is a God in Heaven you will undoubtedly receive your reward. The Almighty can hardly be such a fool as the churches make out. If you keep His laws I don’t think He can care a packet of pins whether you believe in him or not.’

One of the things I enjoy about Maugham is the way he is able to weave together plot and theme in a way that avoids heavy-handedness. And here, in Of Human Bondage, I realize that he is doing the very thing with philosophy. The plot, the progress of Philip Carey through the various stages of his life, is one that clearly lends itself to such a philosophical theme, but still Maugham is able to create something extraordinary out of this simple premise.

‘But if I left my purse behind you would certainly return it to me,’ said Philip.

‘Not from motives of abstract morality, but only from fear of the police.’

‘It’s a thousand to one that the police would never find out.’

‘My ancestors have lived in a civilized state so long that the fear of the police has eaten into my bones. The daughter of my concierge would not hesitate for a moment. You answer that she belongs to the criminal classes; not at all, she is merely devoid of vulgar prejudice.’

‘But then that does away with honour and virtue and goodness and decency and everything,’ said Philip.

‘Have you ever committed a sin?’

‘I don’t know, I suppose so,’ answered Philip.

‘You speak with the lips of a dissenting minister. I have never committed a sin.’

Cronshaw in his shabby great-coat, with the collar turned up, and his hat well down on his head, with his red fat face and his little gleaming eyes, looked extraordinarily comic; but Philip was too much in earnest to laugh.

‘Have you never done anything you regret.’

‘How can I regret when what I did was inevitable?” asked Cronshaw in return.

‘But that’s fatalism.’

‘The illusion which man has that his will is free is so deeply rooted that I am ready to accept it. I act as though I were a free agent. But when an action is performed it is clear that all the forces of the universe from all eternity conspired to cause it, and nothing I could do could have prevented it. It was inevitable. If it was good I can claim no merit; if it was bad I can accept no censure.’

‘My brain reels,’ said Philip.

Perhaps you feel similar to Philip. One’s brain often reels when it wrestles with challenging philosophical concepts. Like all good nihilists, Cronshaw has some well-traveled advice.

‘Have some whisky,’ returned Cronshaw, passing over the bottle. ‘There’s nothing like it for clearing the head. You must expect to be thick-witted if you insist upon drinking beer.’

Philip shook his head, and Cronshaw proceeded:

‘You’re not a bad fellow, but you won’t drink. Sobriety disturbs conversation. But when I speak of good and bad…’ Philip saw he was taking up the thread of his discourse, “I speak conventionally. I attach no meaning to those words. I refuse to make a hierarchy of human actions and ascribe worthiness to some and ill-repute to others. The terms vice and virtue have no significance for me. I do not confer praise or blame: I accept. I am the measure of all things. I am the centre of the world.’

‘But there are one or two other people in the world,’ objected Philip.

‘I speak only for myself. I know them only as they limit my activities. Round each of them too the world turns, and each one for himself is the centre of the universe. My right over them extends only as far as my power. What I can do is the only limit of what I may do. Because we are gregarious we live in society, and society holds together by means of force, force of arms (that is the policeman) and force of public opinion (that is Mrs Grundy). You have society on one hand and the individual on the other: each is an organism striving for self-preservation. It is might against might. I stand alone, bound to accept society and not unwilling, since in return for the taxes I pay it protects me, a weakling, against the tyranny of another stronger than I am; but I submit to its laws because I must; I do not acknowledge their justice; I do not know justice, I only know power. And when I have paid for the policeman who protects me and, if I live in a country where conscription is in force, served in the army which guards my house and land from the invader, I am quits with society: for the rest I counter its might with my wiliness. It makes laws for its self-preservation, and if I break them it imprisons or kills me: it has the might to do so and therefore the right. If I break the laws I will accept the vengeance of the state, but I will not regard it as punishment not shall I feel myself convicted of wrong-going. Society tempts me to its service by honours and riches and the good opinion of my fellows; but I am indifferent to their opinion, I despise honours and I can do very well without riches.’

This is a real primer for Philip: the contention that might makes right, that what ‘is’ is what ‘ought’ to be. It will challenge him, as it does most of us. How he confronts it here will set the example for much of the rest of his story.

‘But if everyone thought like you things would go to pieces at once.’

‘I have nothing to do with others, I am only concerned with myself. I take advantage of the fact that the majority of mankind are led by certain rewards to do things which directly or indirectly tend to my convenience.’

‘It seems to me an awfully selfish way of looking at things,’ said Philip.

‘But are you under the impression that men ever do anything except for selfish reasons?’

‘Yes.’

‘It is impossible that they should. You will find as you grow older that the first thing needful to make the world a tolerable place to live is to recognize the inevitable selfishness of humanity. You demand unselfishness from others, which is a preposterous claim that they should sacrifice their desires to yours. Why should they? When you are reconciled to the fact that each is for himself in the world you will ask less from your fellows. They will not disappoint you, and you will look upon them more charitably. Men seek but one thing in life -- their pleasure.’

‘No, no, no!’ cried Philip.

Cronshaw chuckled.

‘You rear like a frightened colt, because I use a word to which your Christianity ascribes a deprecatory meaning. You have a hierarchy of values; pleasure is at the bottom of the ladder, and you speak with a little thrill of self-satisfaction of duty, charity, and truthfulness. You think pleasure is only of the senses; the wretched slaves who manufactured your morality despised a satisfaction which they had small means of enjoying. You would not be so frightened if I had spoken of happiness instead of pleasure: it sounds less shocking, and your mind wanders from the sty of Epicurus to his garden. But I will speak of pleasure, for I see that men aim at that, and I do not know what they aim at happiness. It is pleasure that lurks in the practice of every one of your virtues. Man performs actions because they are good for him, and when they are good for other people as well they are thought virtuous: if he finds pleasure in giving alms he is charitable; if he finds pleasure in helping others he is benevolent; if he finds pleasure in working for society he is public-spirited; but it is for your private pleasure that you give twopence to a beggar as much as it is for my private pleasure that I drink another whisky and soda. I, less of a humbug than you, neither applaud myself for my pleasure nor demand your admiration.’

This is a kind of out if Philip is able to see it this way. For what does it matter than a man does charity for his own pleasure if it means that the charity is done? Would Philip rather live in a world where good things were only done when man went against the things that give him pleasure? To whose benefit would such a universe inure? He’ll try to defend that view next.

‘But have you never known people do things they didn’t want to instead of things they did?’

‘No. You put your question foolishly. What you mean is that people accept an immediate pain rather than an immediate pleasure. The objection is as foolish as your manner of putting it. It is clear that men accept an immediate pain rather than an immediate pleasure, but only because they expect a greater pleasure in the future. Often the pleasure is illusory, but their error in calculation is no refutation of the rule. You are puzzled because you cannot get over the idea that pleasures are only of the senses; but, child, a man who dies for his country dies because he likes it as surely as a man eats pickled cabbage because he likes it. It is a law of creation. If it were possible for men to prefer pain to pleasure the human race would have long since become extinct.’

‘But if all that is true,’ cried Philip, ‘what is the use of anything? If you take away duty and goodness and beauty, why are we brought into the world?’

Another childish question, no doubt, from Cronshaw’s point of view. And his way of responding to it will come to have substantial meaning for Philip later in the novel.

‘Here comes the gorgeous East to suggest an answer,’ smiled Cronshaw.

He pointed to two persons who at that moment opened the door of the cafe, and, with a blast of cold air, entered. They were Levantines, itinerant vendors of cheap rugs, and each bore on his arm a bundle. It was Sunday evening, and the cafe was very full. They passed among the tables, and in that atmosphere heavy and discoloured with tobacco smoke, rank with humanity, they seemed to bring an air of mystery. They were clad in European, shabby clothes, their thin great-coats were threadbare, but each wore a tarboosh. Their faces were grey with cold. One was of middle age, with a black beard, but the other was a youth of eighteen, with a face deeply scarred by smallpox and with one eye only. They passed by Cronshaw and Philip.

‘Allah is great, and Mahomet is his prophet,’ said Cronshaw impressively.

The elder advanced with a cringing smile, like a mongrel used to blows. WIth a sidelong glance at the door and a quick surreptitious movement he showed a pornographic picture.

‘Are you Masr-ed-Deen, the merchant of Alexandria, or is it from far Bagdad that you bring your goods, O, my uncle; and yonder one-eyed youth, do I see in him one of the three kings of whom Scheherazade told stories to her lord?’

The pedlar’s smile grew more ingratiating, though he understood no word of what Cronshaw said, and like a conjurer he produced a sandal-wood box.

‘Nay, show us the priceless web of Eastern looms,’ quoth Cronshaw. ‘For I would point a moral and adorn a tale.’

The Levantine unfolded a tablecloth, red and yellow, vulgar, hideous and grotesque.

‘Thirty-five francs,’ he said.

‘O, my uncle, this cloth knew not the weavers of Samarkand, and those colours were never made in the vasts of Bokhara.’

‘Twenty-five francs,’ smiled the pedlar obsequiously.

‘Ultima Thule was the place of its manufacture, even Birmingham, the place of my birth.’

‘Fifteen francs,’ cringed the bearded man.

‘Get thee gone, fellow,’ said Cronshaw. ‘May wild asses defile the grave of thy maternal grandmother.’

Imperturbably, but smiling no more, the Levantine passed with his wares to another table. Cronshaw turned to Philip.

‘Have you ever been to the Cluny, the museum? There you will see Persian carpets of the most exquisite hue and of a pattern the beautiful intricacy of which delights and amazes the eye. In them you will see the mystery and the sensual beauty of the East, the roses of Hafiz and the wine-cup of Omar; but presently you will see more. You were asking just now what was the meaning of life. Go and look at those Persian carpets, and one of these days the answer will come to you.’

‘You are cryptic,’ said Philip.

‘I am drunk,’ answered Cronshaw.

This is fun -- at least it is for me. Like Philip, I have spent many a youthful hour with figures like Cronshaw, teasing apart the reality that exists from the one I dimly perceive. And, as mentioned above, Cronshaw’s riddle of the Persian carpet will nag at Philip through much of the novel that is to come.

Art Above All

Philip is in Paris in order to become a painter. And in that environment he is thrown together with yet another group of people. Not philosophers -- at least not consciously so -- but artists. And they will teach him many things that the philosophers couldn’t.

Philip, puzzled, looked at the picture he was painting: the mind behind that broad brow was trivial; and the flashing, passionate eyes saw nothing in life but the obvious. Philip was not satisfied with his portrait, and at the end of a sitting he nearly always scraped out what he had done. It was all very well to aim at the intention of the soul: who could tell what that was when people seemed a mass of contradictions? He liked Miguel, and it distressed him to realize that his magnificent struggle was futile: he had everything to make a good writer but talent. Philip looked at his own work. How could you tell whether there was anything in it or whether you were wasting your time? It was clear that the will to achieve could not help you and confidence in yourself meant nothing. Philip thought of Fanny Price; she had a vehement belief in her talent; her strength of will was extraordinary.

Miguel and Fanny Price -- an author and a fellow painter -- both with an almost delusional blindness to their own lack of talent; and each, like Philip, trying to make their way in a world of fashion and extremity. In the wake of their journeys, Philip questions not just his own talent, but his own commitment that the path he believed was his to walk.

And then he hears, from a fellow art student named Clutton, of yet another artist.

‘D’you remember my telling you about that chap I met in Brittany? I saw him the other day here. He’s just off to Tahiti. He was broke to the world. He was a brasseur d’affaires, a stockbroker I suppose you call it in English; and he had a wife and family, and he was earning a large income. He chucked it all to become a painter. He just went off and settled down in Brittany and began to paint. He hadn’t got any money and did the next best thing to starving.’

This is, of course, Charles Strickland, the protagonist of Maughan’s other masterpiece, The Moon and Sixpence, and Philip has the same question about him as everyone else.

‘And what about his wife and family?’ asked Philip.

‘Oh, he dropped them. He left them to starve on their own account.’

‘It sounds a pretty low-down thing to do.’

It is. Clearly. But Clutton understands why it can be necessary.

‘Oh, my dear fellow, if you want to be a gentleman you must give up being an artist. They’ve got nothing to do with one another. You hear of men painting pot-boilers to keep an aged mother -- well, it shows they’re excellent sons, but it’s no excuse for bad work. They’re only tradesmen. An artist would let his mother go to the workhouse. There’s a writer I know over here who told me that his wife died in childbirth. He was in love with her and he was mad with grief, but as he sat at the bedside watching her die he found himself making mental notes of how she looked and what she said and the things he was feeling. Gentlemanly, wasn’t it?’

‘But is your friend a good painter?’ asked Philip.

‘No, not yet, he paints just like Pissaro. He hasn’t found himself, but he’s got a sense of colour and a sense of decoration. But that isn’t the question. It’s the feeling, and that he’s got. He’s behaved like a perfect cad to his wife and children, he’s always behaving like a perfect cad; the way he treats the people who’ve helped him -- and sometimes he’s been saved from starvation merely by the kindness of his friends -- is simply beastly. He just happens to be a great artist.’

Philip pondered over the man who was willing to sacrifice everything, comfort, home, money, love, honour, duty, for the sake of getting on to canvas with paint the emotion which the world gave him. It was magnificent, and yet his courage failed him.

And this, ultimately, is the difference between Charles Strickland and Philip Carey. Art requires all. Anything less means, no matter how accomplished, that one is a tradesman, not an artist. Because Art is not the paint on the canvas. Art is in the putting of the paint on the canvas.

The Failure of Philosophy

So early on Philip talks about philosophy -- with Hayward, with Weeks, with Cronshaw. But later he begins to live philosophy. Or at least he tries to, aggressively searching for a philosophy with a practical application and utility to life as it is lived. In this quest he is bitterly disappointed.

He had thought of love as a rapture which seized one so that all the world seemed spring-like, he had looked forward to an ecstatic happiness; but this was not happiness; it was a hunger of the soul, it was a painful yearning, it was a bitter anguish, he had never known before. He tried to think when it had first come to him. He did not know. He only remembered that each time he had gone into the shop, after the first two or three times, it had been with a little feeling in the heart that was pain; and he remembered that when she spoke to him he felt curiously breathless. When she left him it was wretchedness, and when she came to him again it was despair.

This is shortly after Philip meets Mildred Rogers, the woman who will hold him in the bondage aptly described in this short passage. It is, essentially, desire -- desire for something unattainable and, in the case of Mildred, desire grafted onto a thing cold and inscrutable.

The fact remained that he was helpless. He felt just as he had felt sometimes in the hands of a bigger boy at school. He had struggled against the superior strength till his own strength was gone, and he was rendered quite powerless -- he remembered the peculiar languor he had felt in his limbs, almost as though he were paralyzed -- so that he could not help himself at all. He might have been dead. He felt just that same weakness now. He loved the woman so that he knew he had never loved before. He did not mind her faults of person or of character, he thought he loved them too: at all events they meant nothing to him. It did not seem himself that was concerned; he felt that he had been seized by some strange force that moved him against his will, contrary to his interests; and because he had a passion for freedom he hated the chains which bound him. He laughed at himself when he thought how often he had longed to experience the overwhelming passion. He cursed himself because he had given way to it.

And worse, none of his previous philosophy served him any purpose in this predicament.

One thing that struck him was how little under those circumstances it mattered what one thought; the system of personal philosophy, which had given him great satisfaction to devise, had not served him. He was puzzled by this.

Philosophy wilts in the face of desire. As Philip will come to learn, against the raging need, personal philosophy doesn’t stand a chance.

The Delightful Habit of Reading

‘When I read a book I seem to read it with my eyes only, but now and then I come across a passage, perhaps only a phrase, which has meaning for me, and it becomes part of me; I’ve got out of the book all that’s any use to me, and I can’t get anything more if I read it a dozen times. You see, it seems to me, one’s like a closed bud, and most of what one reads and does has no effect at all; but there are certain things that have a peculiar significance for one, and they open a petal; and the petals open one by one; and at last the flower is there.’

Before starting this blog, I spent a lot of my mental energy on another blog which I named after a particularly compelling phrase from Moby-Dick. My motivation in doing so is remarkably similar to Philip’s concept here of a flower opening, petal by petal, as the bits and pieces of meaning found in books comes into a reader’s consciousness.

It is one of the things that makes Philip endearing, one of the things that makes his plight ours.

Insensibly he formed the most delightful habit in the world, the habit of reading: he did not know that thus he was providing himself with a refuge from all the distress of life; he did not know either that he was creating for himself an unreal world which would make the real world of every day a source of bitter disappointment.

Maugham will reinforce this theme and dynamic throughout the novel -- how Philip’s seduction by books is the cause of both his joy and his despair. First there is joy:

One day Miss Wilkinson gave Philip La Vie de Boheme. … Philip began to read Murger’s fascinating, ill-written, absurd masterpiece, and fell at once under its spell. His soul danced with joy at that picture of starvation which is so good-humoured, of squalor which is so picturesque, of sordid love which is so romantic, of bathos which is so moving. Rodolphe and Mimi, Musette and Schaunard! They wander through the grey streets of the Latin Quarter, finding refuge now in one attic, now in another, in their quaint costumes of Louis Philippe, with their tears and their smiles, happy-go-lucky and reckless. Who can resist them? It is only when you return to the book with a sounder judgement that you find how gross their pleasures were, how vulgar their minds; and you feel the utter worthlessness, as artists and as human beings, of that gay procession. Philip was enraptured.

And then there is despair:

He did not know how wide a country, arid and precipitous, must be crossed before the traveller through life comes to an acceptance of reality. It is an illusion that youth is happy, an illusion of those who have lost it; but the young know they are wretched, for they are full of the truthless ideals which have been instilled into them, and each time they come in contact with the real they are bruised and wounded. It looks as if they were victims of a conspiracy; for the books they read, ideal by the necessity of selection, and the conversation of their elders, who look back upon the past through a rosy haze of forgetfulness, prepare them for an unreal life. They must discover for themselves that all they have read and all they have been told are lies, lies, lies; and each discovery is another nail driven into the body on the cross of life.

But in this regard, Philip is somewhat unique. His friend Hayward, for example, has an entirely different reaction to and use for books.

But Hayward could still talk delightfully about books; his taste was exquisite and his discrimination elegant; and he had a constant interest in ideas, which made him an entertaining companion. They meant nothing to him really, since they never had any effect on him; but he treated them as he might have pieces of china in an auction-room, handling them with pleasure in their shape and their glaze, pricing them in his mind; and then, putting them back into their case, thought of no more.

In this comparison, we perhaps see the essential difference that makes Philip susceptible to the kind of bondage that gives the novel its title. As Philip searches for a philosophy that will provide the explanations he needs, he will use -- with failure after the failure -- the measure of efficacy to determine its worth.

He had long come to the conclusion that nothing amused him more than metaphysics, but he was not so sure of their efficacy in the affairs of life. The neat little system which he had formed as the result of his meditations at Blackstable had not been of conspicuous use during his infatuation for Mildred. He could not be positive that reason was much help in the conduct of life. It seemed to him that life lived itself. He remembered very vividly the violence of the emotion which has possessed him and his inability, as if were tied down to the ground with ropes, to react against it. He read many wise things in books, but he could only judge from his own experience (he did not know whether he was different from other people); he did not calculate the pros and cons of an action, the benefits which must befall him if he did it, the harm which might result from the omission; but his whole being was urged on irresistibly. He did not act with a part of himself but altogether. The power that possessed him seemed to have nothing to do with reason: all that reason did was to point out the methods of obtaining what his whole soul was striving for.

Hayward is not so troubled. For him, the different books of philosophy were only shiny baubles to hang on the tree of his own experience. They may mean something, and one of them may be right, but none of that meant as much as the mental thrill of contemplating them.

The Angry Determinist

What this is all driving towards -- of course -- is determinism; the philosophical position that we are not agents acting freely, but machines acting according to our programs. The character Philip Carey will come to embrace this philosophy, but interestingly, so will the author Somerset Maugham who, in staging the drama that consumes much of the novel, will set it on such a deterministic course that the reader would have to be obtuse to miss it.

There is a revolving passel of characters who feel love for each other, but only in a one-way chain, and never for the person who feels it for them. Nora Nesbitt loves Philip Carey. Philip Carey loves Mildred Rogers. Mildred Rogers loves Harry Griffiths. Such a tangle means certain things will happen and certain things won’t -- and as each character careens towards their fate they seem the only one oblivious to their fate.

Here’s one scene in which that painful collision seems more apparent than in others.

‘Philip, [Mildred said, ‘]I’m afraid I shan’t be able to go away on Saturday. The doctor says I oughtn’t to.’

He knew this was not true, but he answered:

‘When will you be able to come away?’

She glanced at him, saw that his face was white and rigid, and looked nervously away. She was at that moment a little afraid of him.

She should be. At this point Philip has stayed with her and helped her support herself and another man’s baby, and she is about to secretly steal away with Philip’s friend Griffiths -- and Philip knows it. He is, in the subtext of the novel, the angry determinist while Mildred remains the deluded free agent.

‘I may as well tell you and have done with it, I can’t come away with you at all.’

‘I thought you were driving at that. It’s too late to change your mind now. I’ve got the tickets and everything.’

‘You said you didn’t wish me to go unless I wanted it too, and I don’t.’

‘I’ve changed my mind. I’m not going to have any more tricks played with me. You must come.’

‘I like you very much, Philip, as a friend. But I can’t bear to think of anything else. I don’t like you that way. I couldn’t, Philip.’

‘You were quite willing to a week ago.’

“It was different then.’

‘You hadn’t met Griffiths?’

‘You said yourself I couldn’t help it if I’m in love with him.’

This is a remarkable scene. Read on and see how Maugham slowly makes his characters aware -- perhaps for the first time -- that they are not free agents, but slaves in bondage.

Her face was set into a sulky look, and she kept her eyes fixed on her plate. Philip was white with rage. He would have liked to hit her in the face with his clenched fist, and in fancy he saw how she would look with a black eye. There were two lads of eighteen dining at a table near them, and now and then they looked at Mildred; he wondered if they envied him dining with a pretty girl; perhaps they were wishing they stood in his shoes. It was Mildred who broke the silence.

‘What’s the good of our going away together? I’d be thinking of him all the time. It wouldn’t be much fun for you.’

‘That’s my business,’ he answered.

She thought over all his reply indicated, and she reddened.

‘But that’s just beastly.’

‘What of it?’

‘I thought you were a gentleman in every sense of the word.’

‘You were mistaken.’

His reply entertained him, and he laughed as he said it.

‘For God’s sake don’t laugh,’ she cried. ‘I can’t come away with you, Philip. I’m awfully sorry. I know I haven’t behaved well to you, but one can’t force themselves.’

‘Have you forgotten that when you were in trouble I did everything for you? I planked out the money to keep you till your baby was born, I paid for your doctor and everything, I paid for you to go to Brighton, and I’m paying for the keep of your baby, I’m paying for your clothes, I’m paying for every stitch you’ve got on now.’

‘If you was a gentleman you wouldn’t throw what you’ve done for me in my face.’

‘Oh, for goodness’ sake, shut up. What d’you suppose I care if I’m a gentleman or not? If I were a gentleman I shouldn’t waste my time with a vulgar slut like you. I don’t care a damn if you like me or not. I’m sick of being made a blasted fool of. You’re jolly well coming to Paris with me on Saturday or you can take the consequences.’

Her cheeks were red with anger, and when she answered her voice had the hard commonness which she concealed generally by a genteel enunciation.

‘I never liked you, not from the beginning, but you forced yourself on me. I always hated it when you kissed me. I wouldn’t let you touch me now not if I was starving.’

Philip tried to swallow the food on his plate, but the muscles of his throat refused to act. He gulped down something to drink and lit a cigarette. He was trembling in every part. He did not speak. He waited for her to move, but she sat in silence, staring at the white tablecloth. If they had been alone he would have flung his arms round her and kissed her passionately; he fancied the throwing back of her long white throat as he pressed upon her mouth with his lips. They passed an hour without speaking, and at last Philip thought the waiter began to stare at them curiously. He called for the bill.

‘Shall we go?’ he said then, in an even tone.

She did not reply, but gathered together her bag and her gloves. She put on her coat.

‘When are you seeing Griffiths again?’

‘Tomorrow,’ she answered indifferently.

‘You’d better talk it over with him.’

She opened her bag mechanically and saw a piece of paper in it. She took it out.

‘Here’s the bill for this dress,’ she said hesitatingly.

‘What of it?’

‘I promised I’d give her the money tomorrow.’

‘Did you?’

‘Does that mean you won’t pay for it after having told me I could get it?’

‘It does.’

‘I’ll ask Harry,’ she said, flushing quickly.

‘He’ll be glad to help you. He owes me seven pounds at the moment, and he pawned his microscope last week, because he was so broke.’

‘You needn’t think you can frighten me by that. I’m quite capable of earning my own living.’

‘It’s the best thing you can do. I don’t propose to give you a farthing more.’

She thought of her rent due on Saturday and the baby’s keep, but did not say anything. They left the restaurant, and in the street Philip asked her:

‘Shall I call a cab for you? I’m going to take a little stroll.’

‘I haven’t got any money. I had to pay a bill this afternoon.’

‘It won’t hurt you to walk. If you want to see me tomorrow I shall be in about tea-time.’

He took off his hat and sauntered away. He looked round in a moment and saw that she was standing helplessly where he had left her, looking at the traffic. He went back and with a laugh pressed a coin into her hand.

‘Here’s two bob for you to get home with.’

Before she could speak he hurried away.

It starts full of emotion, but it slowly drains away. Eventually, Philip and Mildred are left only with their awareness of how their uncontrollable actions have them in bondage -- both to those actions and to each other, a self-devouring cycle with no other way forward.

Ungovernable Desire

This, I think, is the most common theme of Maugham’s novel -- the determinism that rules us and one agent’s desperate and struggle to come to some kind of terms with it.

He did not know what it was that passed from a man to a woman, from a woman to a man, and made one of them a slave: it was convenient to call it the sexual instinct; but if it was no more than that, he did not understand why it should occasion so vehement an attraction to one person rather than another. It was irresistible: the mind could not battle with it; friendship, gratitude, interest, had no power beside it. Because he had not attracted Mildred sexually, nothing that he did had any effect upon her. The idea revolted him; it made human nature beastly; and he felt suddenly that the hearts of men were full of dark places. Because Mildred was indifferent to him he had thought her sexless; her anaemic appearance and thin lips, the body with its narrow hips and flat chest, the languor of her manner, carried out his supposition; and yet she was capable of sudden passions which made her willing to risk everything to gratify them. He had never understood her adventure with Emil Miller: it had seemed so unlike her, and she had never been able to explain it; but now that he had seen her with Griffiths he knew that just the same thing had happened then: she had been carried off her feet by an ungovernable desire. He tried to think out what those two men had which so strangely attracted her. They both had a vulgar facetiousness which tickled her simple sense of humour, and a certain coarseness of nature; but what took her perhaps was the blatant sexuality which was their most marked characteristic. She had a genteel refinement which shuddered at the facts of life, she looked upon the bodily functions as indecent, she had all sorts of euphemisms for common objects, she always chose an elaborate word as more becoming than a simple one: the brutality of these men was like a whip on her thin white shoulders, and she shuddered with voluptuous pain.

He did not know. He did not understand.

It was irresistible. The mind could not battle with it. [He] had no power beside it. An ungovernable desire.

Slaves. Whips. Shuddered with voluptuous pain.

These are words and phrases not chosen at random. They build and support Maugham’s overall theme: the uselessness of the mind’s tender philosophy in the face of the universe’s brutal determinism.

He considered with some irony the philosophy which he had developed for himself, for it had not been of much use to him in the conjecture he had passed through; and he wondered whether thought really helped a man in any of the critical affairs of life: it seemed to him rather that he was swayed by some power alien to and yet within himself, which urged him like that great wind of Hell which drove Paolo and Francesca ceaselessly on. He thought of what he was going to do and, when the time came to act, he was powerless in the grasp of instincts, emotions, he knew not what. He acted as though he were a machine driven by two forces of his environment and his personality; his reason was someone looking on, observing the facts but powerless to interfere: it was like those gods of Epicurus who saw the doings of men from their empyrean heights, and had no might to alter one smallest particle of what occurred.

In this state, Philip will initially come to hate the human creatures that surround him -- and, of course, hating himself more in the projection.

It was a sordid scene. Philip leaned over the rail, staring down, and he ceased to hear the music. They danced furiously. They danced round the room, slowly, talking very little, with all their attention given to the dance. The room was hot, and their faces shone with sweat. It seemed to Philip that they had thrown off the guard which people wear on their expression, the homage to convention, and he saw them now as they really were. In that moment of abandon they were strangely animal: some were foxy and some were wolflike; and others had the long, foolish face of sheep. Their skins were sallow from the unhealthy life they led and the poor food they ate. Their features were blunted by mean interests, and their little eyes were shifty and cunning. There was nothing of nobility in their bearing, and you felt that for all of them life was a long succession of petty concerns and sordid thoughts. The air was heavy with the musty smell of humanity. But they danced furiously as though impelled by some strange power within them, and it seemed to Philip that they were driven forward by a rage for enjoyment. They were seeking desperately to escape from a world of horror. The desire for pleasure which Cronshaw said was the only motive of human action urged them blindly on, and the very vehemence of the desire seemed to rob it of all pleasure. They were hurried on by a great wind, helplessly, they knew not why and they knew not whither. Fate seemed to tower above them, and they danced as though everlasting darkness were beneath their feet. Their silence was vaguely alarming. It was as if life terrified them and robbed them of power of speech so that the shriek which was in their hearts died in their throats. Their eyes were haggard and grim; and notwithstanding the beastly lust that disfigured them, and the meanness of their faces, and the cruelty, notwithstanding the stupidness which was worst of all, the anguish of those fixed eyes made all that crowd terrible and pathetic. Philip loathed them, and yet his heart ached with the infinite pity which filled him.

But he will come around, seeing the journey that every abandoned soul needs to make in the weary world to be both out of their control and strangely noble.

Neither Tragedy Nor Comedy

And as so often occurs to those who seriously examine the world, a penetrating atheism comes quickly on the heels of the mind’s surrender to determinism. For Philip Carey, it coincides with his return to medicine late in the novel. After seeing hundreds of patients in one of London’s busy clinics, he makes these observations.

But on the whole the impression was neither of tragedy nor of comedy. There was no describing it. It was manifold and curious; there were tears and laughter, happiness and woe; it was tedious and interesting and indifferent; it was as you saw it: it was tumultuous and passionate; it was grave; it was sad and comic; it was trivial; it was simple and complex; joy was there and despair; the love of mothers for their children, and of men for women; lust trailed itself through the rooms with leaden feet, punishing the guilty and the innocent, helpless wives and wretched children; drink seized men and women and cost its inevitable price; death sighed in these rooms; and the beginning of life, filling some poor girl with terror and shame, was diagnosed there. There was neither good nor bad there. There were just facts. It was life.

And if that is life, what is death? Philip cogitates on that subject in the wake of his friend Cronshaw’s demise -- while he sits vigil in the house with Cronshaw’s body.

That thing in the adjoining room, which had been a man and now was nothing, frightened him. The silence seemed alive, as if some mysterious movement were taking place within it; the presence of death weighed upon these rooms, unearthly and terrifying: Philip felt a sudden horror for what had once been his friend. He tried to force himself to read, but presently pushed away his book in despair. What troubled him was the absolute futility of the life which had just ended. It did not matter if Cronshaw was alive or dead. It would have been just as well if he had never lived. Philip thought of Cronshaw young; and it needed an effort of the imagination to picture him slender, with a springing step, and with hair on his head, buoyant and hopeful. Philip’s rule of life, to follow one’s instincts with due regard to the policeman round the corner, had not acted very well there: it was because Cronshaw had done this that he had made such a lamentable failure of existence. It seemed that the instincts could not be trusted. Philip was puzzled, and he asked himself what rule of life was there, if that one was useless, and why people acted in one way rather than in another. They acted according to their emotions, but their emotions might be good or bad; it seemed just a chance whether they led to triumph or disaster. Life seemed an inextricable confusion. Men hurried hither and thither, urged by forces they knew not; and the purpose of it all escaped them; they seemed to hurry just for hurrying’s sake.

Simply an end. Death, simply an end to a meaningless and unfocused life. That, it seems, is the fate none of us can escape.

The Riddle of the Persian Rug

In the end, Philip will find some measure of acceptance of this painful reality -- learning the lesson few do: that if one wants meaning in his life, it is up to him to make it.

The following scene takes place in an art museum.

And it came to him that the gaping sightseers and the fat strangers with their guide-books, and all those mean, common people who thronged the shop, with their trivial desires and vulgar cares, were mortal and must die. They too loved and must part from those they loved, the son from his mother, the wife from her husband; and perhaps it was more tragic because their lives were ugly and sordid, and they knew nothing that gave beauty to the world. There was one stone which was very beautiful, a bas-relief of two young men holding each other’s hand; and the reticence of line, the simplicity, made one like to think that the sculptor here had been touched with a genuine emotion. It was an exquisite memorial to that than which the world offers but one thing more precious, to a friendship; and as Philip looked at it, he felt the tears come to his eyes. He thought of Hayward and his eager admiration for him when first they met, and how disillusion had come and then indifference, till nothing held them together but habit and old memories. It was one of the queer things of life that you saw a person every day for months and were so intinmate with him that you could not imagine existence without him; then separation came and everything went on in the same way, and the companion who had seemed essential proved unnecessary. Your life proceeded and you did not even miss him. Philip thought of those early days in Heidelberg when Hayward, capable of great things, had been full of enthusiasm for the future, and how, little by little, achieving nothing, he had resigned himself to failure. Now he was dead. His death had been as futile as his life. He died ingloriously, of a stupid disease, failing once more, even at the end, to accomplish anything. It was just the same now as if he had never lived.

Philip asked himself desperately what was the use of living at all. It all seemed inane. It was the same with Cronshaw: it was quite unimportant that he had lived; he was dead and forgotten, his book of poems sold in remainder by second-hand booksellers; his life seemed to have served nothing except to give a pushing journalist occasion to write an article in a review. And Philip cried out in his soul:

‘What is the use of it?’

The effort was so incommensurate with the result. The bright hopes of youth had to be paid for at such a bitter price of disillusionment. Pain and disease and unhappiness weighed down the scale so heavily. What did it all mean? He thought of his own life, the high hopes with which he had entered upon it, the limitations which his body forced upon him, his friendlessness, and the lack of affection which had surrounded his youth. He did not know that he had ever done anything but what seemed best to do, and what a cropper he had come! Other men, with no more advantages than he, succeeded, and others again, with many more, failed. It seemed pure chance. The rain fell alike upon the just and upon the unjust, and for nothing was there a why and a wherefore.

This is ground we have already tread. But wait, what was that thing that Cronshaw had once said?

Thinking of Cronshaw, Philip remembered the Persian rug which he had given him, telling him that it offered an answer to his question upon the meaning of life; and suddenly the answer occurred to him: he chuckled: now that he had it, it was like one of the puzzles which you worry over till you are shown the solution and then cannot imagine how it could ever have escaped you. The answer was obvious. Life had no meaning. On earth, satellite of a star speeding through space, living things had arisen under the influence of conditions which were part of the planet’s history; and as there had been a beginning of life upon it, so, under the influence of other conditions, there would be an end: man, no more significant than other forms of life, had come not as the climax of creation but as a physical reaction to the environment. Philip remembered the story of the Eastern King who, desiring to know the history of man, was brought by a sage five hundred volumes; busy with affairs of state, he bade him go and condense it; in twenty years the sage returned and his history now was in no more than fifty volumes, but the King, too old then to read so many ponderous tomes, bade him go and shorten it once more; twenty years passed again and the sage, old and grey, brought a single book in which was the knowledge the King had sought; but the King lay on his death-bed, and he had not time to read even that; and then the sage gave him the history of man in a single line; it was this: he was born, he suffered, and he died. There was no meaning in life, and man by living served no end. It was immaterial whether he was born or not born, whether he lived or ceased to live. Life was insignificant and death without consequence. Philip exulted, as he had exulted in his boyhood when the weight of a belief in God was lifted from his shoulders: it seemed to him that the last burden of responsibility was taken from him; and for the first time he was utterly free. His insignificance was turned to power, and he felt himself suddenly equal with the cruel fate which had seemed to persecute him; for, if life was meaningless, the world was robbed of its cruelty. What he did or left undone did not matter. Failure was unimportant and success amounted to nothing. He was the most inconsiderable creature in that swarming mass of mankind which for a brief space occupied the surface of the earth; and he was almighty because he had wrenched from chaos the secret of its nothingness. Thoughts came tumbling over one another in Philip’s eager fancy, and he took long breaths of joyous satisfaction. He felt inclined to leap and sing. He had not been so happy for months.

‘Oh life,’ he cried in his heart, ‘oh life, where is thy sting?’

And the rug? Cronshaw’s riddle of the Persian rug?

For the same uprush of fancy which had shown him with all the force of mathematical demonstration that life had no meaning, brought with it another idea; and that was why Cronshaw, he imagined, had given him the Persian rug. As the weaver elaborated his pattern for no end but the pleasure of his aesthetic sense, so might a man live his life, or if one was forced to believe that his actions were outside his choosing, so might a man look at his life, that it made a pattern. There was as little need to do this as there was use. It was merely something he did for his own pleasure. Out of the manifold events of his life, his deeds, his feelings, his thoughts, he might make a design, regular, elaborate, complicated, or beautiful; and though it might be no more than an illusion that he had the power of selection, though it might be no more than a fantastic legerdemain in which appearances were interwoven with moonbeams, that did not matter: it seemed, and so to him it was. In the vast warp of life (a river arising from no spring and flowing endlessly to no sea), with the background to his fancies that there was no meaning and that nothing was important, a man might get a personal satisfaction in selecting the various strands that worked out the pattern. There was one pattern, the most obvious, perfect, and beautiful, in which a man was born, grew to manhood, married, produced children, toiled for his bread, and died; but there were others, intricate and wonderful, in which happiness did not enter and in which success was not attempted; and in them might be discovered a more troubling grace. Some lives, and Hayward’s was among them, the blind indifference of chance cut off while the design was still imperfect; and then the solace was comfortable that it did not matter; other lives, such as Cronshaw’s, offered a pattern which was difficult to follow: the point of view had to be shifted and old standards had to be altered before one could understand that such a life was its own justification. Philip thought that in throwing over the desire for happiness he was casting aside the last of his illusions. His life had seemed horrible when it was measured by its happiness, but now he seemed to gather strength as he realized that it might be measured by something else. Happiness mattered as little as pain. They came in, both of them, as all the other details of his life came in, to the elaboration of the design. He seemed for an instant to stand above the accidents of his existence, and he felt that they could not affect him again as they had done before. Whatever happened to him now would be more motive to add to the complexity of the pattern, and when the end approached he would rejoice in its completion. It would be a work of art, and it would be none the less beautiful because he alone knew of its existence, and with his death it would at once cease to be.

Philip was happy.

And that, I think, is the philosophical lesson of this very philosophical novel. The purpose of life is to live it. That and nothing more.

The Helpless Instruments of Blind Chance

Philip was at his uncle’s bedside as the elderly man died.

Philip gave him his hand and he clung to it as to life, for comfort in his extremity. Perhaps he had never really loved anyone in all his days, but now he turned instinctively to a human being. His hand was wet and cold. It grasped Philip’s with feeble, despairing energy. The old man was fighting with the fear of death. And Philip thought that all must go through that. Oh, how monstrous it was, and they could believe in a God that allowed His creatures to suffer such a cruel torture! He had never cared for his uncle, and for two years he had longed every day for his death; but now he could not overcome the compassion that filled his heart. What a price it was to pay for being other than the beasts!

What a price, indeed.

Philip has come a long way in the novel -- from the lost and abandoned orphan, raised to believe that bondage to desire, when directed as a moral society dictated, is the highest ideal, to the philosophical atheist with compassion for every creature trudging their way through they own dim and misunderstood journey. In a closing moment of reflection, Philip himself comes to understand that his revelation may never have come to him had it not been for the adversities of his youth. In his opening line here, he is thinking about his club-foot, and with these thoughts, I will close my treatment of the novel.

He accepted the deformity which had made life so hard for him; he knew that it had warped his character, but now he saw also that by reason of it he had acquired that power of introspection which had given him so much delight. Without it he would never have had his keen appreciation of beauty, his passion for art and literature, and his interest in the varied spectacle of life. The ridicule and the contempt which had so often been heaped upon him had turned his mind inward and called forth those flowers which he felt would never lose their fragrance. Then he saw that the normal was the rarest thing in the world. Everyone had some defect, of body or of mind: he thought of all the people he had known (the whole world was like a sick-house, and there was no rhyme or reason in it), he saw a long procession, deformed in body and warped in mind, some with illness of the flesh, weak hearts or weak lungs, and some with illness of the spirit, languor of will, or a craving for liquor. At this moment he could feel a holy compassion for them all. They were the helpless instruments of blind chance.

+ + +

This post first appeared on Eric Lanke's blog, an association executive and author. You can follow him on Twitter @ericlanke or contact him at eric.lanke@gmail.com.


Monday, December 7, 2020

Dragons - Chapter 51 (DRAFT)

Thirteen minutes later I was sitting at one of the banquet tables that were in the process of being set for one the evening sessions. These were major undertakings, each sponsored by one of the corporate supporters that Mary spent most of her time wooing, each featuring presentations from the biggest names in their fields, and each scrupulously set to serve a preliminary dinner to no less (and no more) than 300 people.

Three hundred people meant thirty banquet rounds of ten settings each. Each table would have its own server, male and female alike in starched white shirts, each grouping of five tables supervised by a banquet captain in black coat and tie. Now, twenty-four minutes prior to door opening, those sixteen people were working furiously, darting between, and servicing the tables. The linens, plates, flatware, and glasses were all in place; the baskets of bread, pads of butter, and pre-set salads being dropped with clockwork efficiency.

Searching for a place for a private conversation, Mary and Eleanor had brought me here, and now the three of us sat in three consecutive chairs at one of these tables, the floral centerpiece posing too great a barrier for a conversation sitting opposite each other. Eleanor, dressed as if attending an opera, sat to my immediate left; Mary just beyond, each of us with our bodies turned in such a fashion to maintain eye contact with one another.

“Alan,” Eleanor began, patting my hand on the table like her star pupil. “I’m so glad we were able to find these few moments to connect on what has surely been a hectic and successful day.”

Eleanor’s eyes were smiling, but behind her permed hair I could see Mary’s eyes studying me, and there were no smiles there at all.

I had no idea how to play this. The tension in the air felt like Eleanor had a gun in her pocketbook. I smiled as sweetly as I could, returning Eleanor’s pat on the hand. “Me, too.”

Eleanor slowly drew her hand back. “I suppose I should start by thanking you.”

“Thanking me?”

“Yes. For the way you handled Mr. Rockhammer at lunch today. I trust you were able to find another session for him to attend?”

“Absolutely,” I lied easily, knowing the facts would not be checked, since this compliment was little more than a smokescreen. “He was very pleased with the re-accommodation.”

“I’m glad,” Eleanor said, her smile so genuine that for a moment I wondered if I had read her intentions correctly. “But there is another matter we must discuss.”

An uncomfortable silence settled down among the three of us, the constant sound of clinking glasses and dropped plates rising to prominence. I think Eleanor was waiting for me to speak first, to acknowledge the unfortunate incident, to admit my failure, to beg her forgiveness -- but I decided not to give her that satisfaction.

“Oh?”

Eleanor’s smile disappeared. “Yes,” she said. “I’m speaking of the embarrassment with Dr. Lancaster’s slides.”

I nodded. “Yes,” I said easily, adopting a tone as if we were blue bloods commiserating on the club lounge running out of our preferred brand of gin. “That was unfortunate. A simple mix-up, really. One that was easily corrected.”

I was trying to head a drubbing down off at the pass, but I could already see by the look on Eleanor’s face how unlikely that outcome was going to be.

“Alan,” Eleanor said seriously. “Dr. Lancaster was embarrassed in a lecture hall filled with his peers and admirers. Do you not understand the gravity of that situation?”

I took the smile off my face and matched Eleanor’s stern countenance. “Of course I do.”

“I’ve spoken to Mary and she tells me that the plenary session was your responsibility.”

Of course she did. I looked at Mary and she looked back impassively. She had either gone deaf or had bought a new poker face in the hotel gift shop. And this time I knew Eleanor wasn’t going to speak again until I did.

“Yes,” I admitted. “That’s true.”

“Then can you help me understand what happened? I’ve spoken to Dr. Lancaster and he is rightfully upset.”

At the mention of Dr. Lancaster’s name, I remembered the jovial and easy-going man I had dealt with in the speaker ready room. “I can talk to Dr. Lancaster if you like. Explain to him what happened and apologize.”

Eleanor started shaking her head as soon as I started talking. “No. I’ve already apologized on the organization’s behalf. So I think it would be best if I continue to be the one to deal with him. He wants an explanation. He’s entitled to one. But, Alan, I want to give him more than just an explanation. I want to give him evidence that such a thing will never happen to another speaker again.”

At that moment I was startled by a figure that had suddenly appeared at my elbow. It was a middle-aged man in an ill-fitting starched shirt and a bad toupee. He mumbled an apology and then started filling the water glasses on our table from a stainless steel pitcher, the ice clunking noisily into each goblet.

It gave me a second to reflect on what Eleanor had just said, and to realize how uncomfortable I was with her desire for evidence that such a thing would never happen again. What kind of evidence could she be looking for?

Eleanor’s hand was suddenly patting mine again.

“Alan, why don’t you just tell me how this embarrassing thing happened.”

She was speaking to me like she was my friend, and despite my inability to shake the suspicion that she was more like the cop asking the three-time loser to just confess or rat out his friends, I went ahead and told her, from my point of view, what happened. I told her about the discussion in the speaker ready room, about the creative solution we had come up with, and about Dr. Lancaster’s acceptance of it. None of it seemed to be what Eleanor was looking for.

“How did the slide get inverted?” she asked pointedly, before I had really finished my explanation, but after the banquet staff person had moved onto the next table, as if this was a line of inquiry that was not to be overheard.

I chose my words very carefully. “It was placed in the slide tray backwards.”

Eleanor wrinkled her nose. “Backwards? What do you mean backwards?”

I looked briefly at Mary. Does Eleanor really not understand how slide projection works? I tried to ask her with my eyes, but there was no response, nonverbal or otherwise.

“Opposite of the way it should have been,” I replied. “When the light shined through it to project an image, all the words appeared backwards. What was left should have been right and what was right should have been left.”

I was worried that my reply was too condescending, but Eleanor did not react negatively. She simply nodded with apparent understanding.

“I see,” she said. “And who was it that put this slide in backwards?”

The italics were clear in her tone, not like she was speaking ironically, but like she was speaking a foreign word she had just learned. I tried not to let it distract me, because I saw the trap she was about to spring on me. Tell the truth, say that Dr. Lancaster had put in his own slides, indeed, that he wouldn’t let anyone else touch them, and I would be besmirching the reputation and competence of her mentor and friend. That, I knew, would offend Eleanor’s sense of propriety. Giants like Douglas Lancaster did not make mistakes like this. Not, at least, when he had sycophants like Eleanor Rumford protecting his reputation.

I looked at Mary again, willing to take whatever guidance she might offer, and was surprised to see that she had something for me. The poker face was gone. Now her head was tilted and she was glaring at me, her directive as clear as the fire in her eyes.

Fall on your sword.

Yes. Of course. Because if Mary had ever tried to teach me anything, it was this. When your leader embarrasses themselves, you take the blame. That was more than just the secret to our success. It was practically our business model.

I considered it. And while considering it I realized the easiest thing to do would be simply to blame it on Ray. It was the AV tech, Eleanor. He loaded Dr. Lancaster’s slides and he must’ve made the mistake with that one. With Mary’s and now Eleanor’s eyes drilling into me, throwing Ray under the bus seemed not just like the easiest thing to do. It seemed like the right thing to do.

“Dr. Lancaster must have,” I said. “He gave us his carousel with his slides already loaded into it.”

The silence that followed these words was even deeper than the one we had experienced earlier. I purposely avoided looking at Mary, but I could not avoid Eleanor’s eyes. I could have been mistaken. My heart was beating so wildly in my chest that I would not surprise me if it blurred my vision. But it appeared to me that the tiniest little twinkle of a tear beaded up in the corner of her eye.

“Did you not check them?” she asked me eventually.

“No,” I said. “There wasn’t time. He gave them to us just minutes before the session started. I’m awfully sorry, Eleanor.”

And I was, the feeling of regret as real as any I had ever felt.

Eleanor only nodded knowingly. “How did you discover the error?”

“I was told there was something wrong in the session room. As soon as I stepped inside, I saw what the problem was, and fixed it as quickly as I could.”

“Stepped inside?” Mary suddenly asked, speaking for the first time.

“Yes,” I said, a little startled. “I was out in the foyer.”

“What were you doing in the foyer when the plenary session you were responsible for was going on in the ballroom?”

And there it was. I had danced around several of them in the course of this conversation, but there, finally, was the trap I was fated to fall into. No. Not fated. Conspired. No matter what I did, Eleanor and Mary were determined to catch me in one of their snares.

“I was making a phone call,” I said.

“A phone call? To who?”

“To my wife.”

“To your wife!” Eleanor exclaimed, her hand shooting out to cover mine again. “Is everything all right? Isn’t she expecting your second?”

At that point, I don’t know what surprised me more. The fact that Eleanor Rumford knew Jenny was pregnant, or the fact that they were going to use even that against me. Because here was another out, another chance to lie, to smooth things over. Actually, no, Eleanor. Jenny’s been struggling with preeclampsia and today her blood pressure went through the roof. She’s been hospitalized, and the baby isn’t far enough along to survive outside the womb. That excuses me, doesn’t it? Excuses me from this otherwise unforgivable sin? I’m sorry that I stepped out on the sacred responsibility of protecting Dr. Lancaster’s reputation and your ego, but I think my wife and my unborn baby might be dying.

No. Probably not.

“She is,” I said to Eleanor. “And thank you for your concern, but no, so far everything is going fine.”

“Then why were you calling her?” Mary asked.

I shrugged, deciding to continue addressing the boss, not her attack dog. “I was just checking in. The days here are so busy, I didn’t know when else I would get the chance. Everything with the session seemed to be going so well. I didn’t think--”

“No,” Mary interrupted viciously. “No, I guess you weren’t thinking, Alan. Eleanor,” she said, greatly softening her tone, “I’m very sorry about this. I’ll be sure to review our procedures with Alan, and from this day forward, we will have someone on our staff double check every slide before it is projected up on one of our screens.”

Eleanor raised her hand midway through Mary’s bootlicking. “Mary, please. I know that you will take the appropriate measures in this unfortunate situation. Alan committed a simple error in judgment. It happens. He is still growing in his position.”

Her voice was sweet, but it was laced with poison. She was clearly neither complimenting me or excusing my behavior. Indeed, especially with her next words, I could see that she was signalling to Mary that she would be perfectly justified in getting rid of me.

“Alan, I know I told you earlier that we would no longer speak of your oversight on the conference program, but now I can’t help but feel that a pattern may be developing. Your hard work on our organization’s behalf is very much appreciated, but too many more slips like this may convince me that you lack the attention to detail that is necessary for a person in your position.”

“Oversight on the conference program?” Mary asked pointedly. “What oversight on the conference program is this?”

Before responding, Eleanor rose to her feet, compelling Mary and me to do the same.

“For now, Mary,” Eleanor said without taking her eyes off of me, “that is between Alan and me. Isn’t it Alan?”

Yes, you bitch. Between you and me and Lily Rasmussen’s gargoyles.

“Yes. Thank you, Eleanor.”

“Thank you, Alan.”

+ + +

“Dragons” is a work of fiction. Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are either the products of the author's imagination or used in a fictitious manner. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, or actual events is purely coincidental. For more information, go here.

This post first appeared on Eric Lanke's blog, an association executive and author. You can follow him on Twitter @ericlanke or contact him at eric.lanke@gmail.com.

Image Source
http://lres.com/heres-why-amcs-need-to-pay-close-attention-to-looming-regulatory-changes/businessman-in-the-middle-of-a-labyrinth/



Monday, November 30, 2020

The Story of Philosophy by Will Durant

I have a love/hate relationship with philosophy. In the abstract, I love it. Thinking about the meaning of life is the pastime of the ages, after all, but often -- too often -- when I sit down to read someone else's thoughts on the subject -- especially someone who lived before the European Renaissance -- I find myself bored, then confused, then intolerant. Remember my pull quote from my recent read of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance:

What I find in Aristotle is mainly a quite dull collection of generalizations, many of which seem impossible to justify in the light of modern knowledge, whose organization appears extremely poor, and which seems primitive in the way old Greek pottery in the museums seems primitive.

Yeah, that.

Maybe my problem is that I don’t really understand the history of philosophy -- the long story of growth and progression of the philosophic art. I tend to pluck a philosopher out of the maelstrom of history without a true understanding of his place or position in what has to be an evolutionary tale. Sure, that philosopher looks like a fossil, but only because I’m looking at him with my modern eyes. If I better understood what was revolutionary about him in his time, I might have a better appreciation of his achievements.

It is with this spirit in mind that I picked up a copy of The Story of Philosophy by Will Durant in some dusty used bookstore somewhere. I was looking for a review course, and I more or less got one. Early on, it included a definition of our subject.

Specifically, philosophy means and includes five fields of study and discourse: logic, esthetics, ethics, politics, and metaphysics.

Logic is the study of ideal method in thought and research: observation and introspection, deduction and induction, hypothesis and experiment, analysis and synthesis -- such as the forms of human activity which logic tries to understand and guide; it is a dull study for most of us, and yet the great events in the history of thought are the improvements men have made in their methods of thinking and research.

Esthetics is the study of ideal form, or beauty; it is the philosophy of art.

Ethics is the study of ideal conduct; the highest knowledge, said Socrates, is the knowledge of good and evil, the knowledge of the wisdom of life.

Politics is the study of ideal social organization (it is not, as one might suppose, the art and science of capturing and keeping office); monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, socialism, anarchism, feminism -- these are the dramatis personae of political philosophy.

And lastly, metaphysics (which gets into so much trouble because it is not, like the other forms of philosophy, an attempt to coordinate the real in the light of the ideal) is the study of the “ultimate reality” of all things: of the real and final nature of “matter” (ontology), of “mind” (philosophical psychology), and of the interrelation of “mind” and “matter” in the process of perception and knowledge (epistemology).

This seems a handy reference to keep at your elbow whenever diving into a philosophic work. If true and complete, we should be able to trace trajectories of philosophic thought along these radial lines -- unless, of course, they wind up intersecting at some point beyond the central hub of their creation.

The rest of Durant’s book, subtitled “The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers” presents a more or less chronological review of some of the most famous philosophies. Beginning with Plato, then moving through Aristotle, Bacon, Spinoza, Voltaire, Kant, Schopenhauer, Spencer, and Nietzsche, and then wrapping up with a few “contemporary” philosophers of note: Bergson, Croce, Russell, Santayana, James and Dewey.

It is not my intention of summarize Durant’s take on every one of these figures, merely to capture the more compelling reactions I had to some of them. So, instead let me try to organize them around the five mentioned domains of philosophy.

Logic

Essential to the domain of logic is the issue of definitions.

“If you wish to converse with me,” said Voltaire, “define your terms.” How many a debate would have been deflated into a paragraph if the disputants had dared to define their terms! This is the alpha and omega of logic, the heart and soul of it, that every important term in serious discourse shall be subjected to strictest scrutiny and definition. It is difficult, and ruthlessly tests the mind; but once done it is half of any task.

I’ve made this remark many times myself -- usually in political conversations with friends and colleagues. If we can’t agree on our terms, that this collection of words has this specific meaning, then how can we hope to agree on anything else? And closely related to this concept is this insightful criticism from Francis Bacon:

“For men converse by means of language; but words are imposed according to the understanding of the crowd; and there arises from a bad and inapt formation of words, a wonderful obstruction to the mind.” Philosophers deal out infinites with the careless assurance of grammarians handling infinitives; and yet does any man know what this “infinite” is, or whether it has even taken the precaution of existing? Philosophers talk about “first cause uncaused,” or “first mover unmoved”; but are not these again fig-leaf phrases used to cover naked ignorance, and perhaps indicative of a guilty conscience in the user? Every clear and honest head knows that no cause can be causeless, nor any mover unmoved. Perhaps the greatest reconstruction in philosophy would be simply this -- that we should stop lying.

Amen. I think its was a contemporary philosopher not cited in Durant’s book that said “that which can be asserted without evidence, can be dismissed without evidence.” Many philosophers, in Durant’s book and out, fall victim to what I see as an essential logical construct. If something cannot be defined, you are not in a position to assert that it exists. To wit:

What is this underlying reality? Spinoza calls it substance, as literally that which stands beneath. Eight generations have fought voluminous battles over the meaning of this term; we must not be discouraged if we fail to resolve the matter in a paragraph. One error we should guard against: substance does not mean the constituent material of anything, as when we speak of wood as the substance of a chair. We approach Spinoza’s use of the word when we speak of “the substance of his remarks.” If we go back to the Scholastic philosophers from whom Spinoza took the term, we find that they used it as a translation of the Greek ousia, which is the present participle of einai, to be, and indicated the inner being or essence. Substance then is that which is (Spinoza had not forgotten the impressive “I am who I am” of Genesis); that which eternally and unchangeably is, and of which everything else must be a transient form or mode. If now we compare this division of the world into substance and modes with its division, in The Improvement of the Intellect, into the eternal order of laws and invariable relations on the one hand, and the temporal order of time-begotten and death-destined things on the other, we are impelled to the conclusion that Spinoza means by substance here very nearly what he meant by the eternal order there. Let us provisionally take it as one element in the term substance, then, that it betokens the very structure of existence, underlying all events and things, and constituting the essence of the world.

And wholly asserted, I suppose. Is there any evidence that Spinoza’s substance, fought voluminously for eight generations, even exists? When it comes to so many of the other domains of philosophy, this essential underpinning of basic logic seems so easily ignored.

I’m not the only philosopher who has noticed this. Here’s something amusing from Voltaire, which may more appropriately be positioned under metaphysics.

Metaphysics

“The further I go, the more I am confirmed in the idea that systems of metaphysics are for philosophers what novels are for women.” It is only charlatans who are certain. We know nothing of first principles. It is truly extravagant to define God, angels, and minds, and to know precisely why God formed the world, when we do not know why we move our arms at will. Doubt is not a very agreeable state, but certainty is a ridiculous one.” “I do not know how I was made, and how I was born. I did not know at all, during a quarter of my life, the causes of what I saw, or heard, or felt. … I have seen that which is called matter, both as the star Sirius, and as the smallest atom which can be perceived with the microscope; and I do not know what this matter is.”

He tells a story of “The Good Brahmin,” who says, “I wish I had never been born!”

“Why so?” said I.

“Because,” he replied, “I have been studying these forty years, and I find that it has been so much time lost. … I believe that I am composed of matter, but I have never been able to satisfy myself what it is that produces thought. I am even ignorant whether my understanding is a simple faculty like that of walking or digesting, or if I think with my head in the same manner as I take hold of a thing with my hands. … I talk a great deal, and when I have done speaking I remain confounded and ashamed of what I have said.”

The same day I had a conversation with an old woman, his neighbor. I asked her if she had ever been unhappy for not understanding how her soul was made? She did not even comprehend my question. She had not, for the briefest moment on her life, had a thought about these subjects with which the good Brahmin had so tormented himself. She believed in the bottom of her heart in the metamorphoses of Vishnu, and provided she could get some of the sacred water of the Ganges in which to make her ablutions, she thought herself the happiest of women. Struck with the happiness of this poor creature, I returned to my philosopher, whom I thus addressed:

“Are you not ashamed to be thus miserable when, not fifty yeards from you, there is an old automaton who thinks of nothing and lives contented?”

“You are right,” he replied. “I have said to myself a thousand times that I should be happy if I were but as ignorant as my old neighbor; and yet it is a happiness which I do not desire.”

This reply of the Brahmin made a greater impression on me than anything that had passed.

Even if Philosophy should end in the total doubt of Montaigne’s “Que sais-je?” it is man’s greatest adventure, and his noblest. Let us learn to be content with modest advances in knowledge, rather than be forever weaving new systems out of our mendacious imagination.

To me, this anecdote is amazing, and refreshing, after the so many attempts I have made to wade through the speculations of so many other philosophers.

Of course, when it comes to exploring metaphysics, one is bound to stumble into the various traps associated with free will. It may provide a helpful bridge to the domain of ethics, since the issue of whether or not we have free will either relates to the true underlying reality of our existence or to our ethical obligations to others or both. You should be free to pick you own poison.

Either way, Spinoza had a lot to say on the subject.

There is, consequently, no free will; the necessities of survival determine instinct, instinct determines desire, and desire determines thought and action. “The decisions of the mind are nothing save desires, which vary according to various dispositions.” “There is in the mind no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined in willing this or that by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause, and this by another, and so on to infinity” “Men think themselves free because they are conscious of their volitions and desires, but are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire.” Spinoza compares the feeling of free will to a stone’s thinking, as it travels through space, that it determines its own trajectory and selects the place and time of its fall.

This seems like such a key point to understanding ourselves and our place in the world around us. Our consciousness observes our behavior, it does not determine it. Disagree with me on that, and you and I are destined to disagree on almost everything else.

Ethics

And here comes the ethical side of that reality. More Spinoza, addressing the key ethical dilemma of determinism.

And let no one suppose that because he is no longer “free,” he is no longer morally responsible for his behavior and the structure of his life. Precisely because men’s actions are determined by their memories, society must for its protection form its citizens through their hopes and fears into some measure of social order and cooperation. All education presupposes determinism, and pours into the open mind of youth a store of prohibitions which are expected to participate in determining conduct. “The evil which ensues from evil deeds is not therefore less to be feared because it comes of necessity; whether our actions are free or not, our motives still are hope and fear. Therefore the assertion is false that I would leave no room for precepts and commands.” On the contrary, determinism makes for a better moral life: it teaches us not to despise or ridicule any one, or be angry with any one; men are “not guilty”; and though we punish miscreants, it will be without hate; we forgive them because they know not what they do.

Determined might mean free from will, but it does not mean free from moral responsibility. The evil which ensues from evil deeds is not less to be feared because it comes of necessity. The determined moral agents in the community around the evil doer still have the responsibility to prevent further evil.

But many philosophers have disagreed on this point. And those on the other side of the argument usually try to summon something more profound than simple human free will out of thin air. Here’s a snippet from Immanuel Kant.

And again, though we cannot prove, we feel, that we are deathless. We perceive that life is not like those dramas so beloved by the people -- in which every villain is punished, and every act of virtue meets with its reward; we learn anew every day that the wisdom of the serpent fares better here than the gentleness of the dove, and that any thief can triumph if he steals enough. If mere wordly utility and expediency were the justification of virtue, it would not be wise to be too good. And yet, knowing all this, having it flung into our faces with brutal repetition, we still feel the command to righteousness, we know that we ought to do the inexpedient good. How could this sense of right survive if it were not that in our hearts we feel this life to be only a part of life, this earthly dream only an embryonic prelude to a new birth, a new awakening; if we did not vaguely know that in that later and longer life the balance will be redressed, and not one cup of water given generously but shall be returned a hundred-fold?

Read that section again. “X” is true because I feel that it is. Does his reason go any deeper than that? If it does, I cannot see it. And I’m not the only one. As scientific naturalism began to get its feet under it in the years after Darwin, the very meaning of good began to change.

The nineteenth century dealt rather hardly with Kant’s ethics, his theory of an innate, a priori, absolute moral sense. The philosophy of evolution suggested irresistibly that the sense of duty is a social deposit in the individual, the content of conscience is acquired, though the vague disposition to social behavior is innate. The moral self, the social man, is no “special creation” coming mysteriously from the hand of God, but the late product of a leisurely evolution. Morals are not absolute; they are a code of conduct more or less haphazardly developed for group survival, and varying with the nature and circumstances of the group: a people hemmed in by enemies, for example, will consider as immoral that zestful and restless individualism which a nation youthful and secure in its wealth and isolation will condone as a necessary ingredient in the exploitation of natural resources and the formation of national character. No action is good in itself, as Kant supposes.

With respect to Kant, I far prefer the thoughts of Voltaire, who earned a special place in my heart when he offered the following as his rationale for writing his Essay on the Morals and the Spirit of the Nations from Charlemagne to Louis XIII.

What Voltaire sought was a unifying principle by which the whole history of civilization in Europe could be woven on one thread; and he was convinced that this thread was the history of culture. He was resolved that his history should deal not with kings but with movements, forces, and masses; not with nations but with the human race; not with wars but with the march of the human mind. “Battles and revolutions are the smallest part of the plan; squadrons and battalions conquering or being conquered, towns taken and retaken, are common to all history. … Take away the arts and the progress of the mind, and you will find nothing” in any age “remarkable enough to attract the attention of posterity.” “I wish to write a history not of wars, but of society; and to ascertain how men lived in the interior of their families, and what were the arts which they commonly cultivated. … My object is the history of the human mind, and not a mere detail of petty facts; nor am I concerned with the history of great lords…; but I want to know what were the steps by which men passed from barbarism to civilization.”

Speaking as someone currently slogging through a work of history too focused on kings and their struggles for dominance, Voltaire’s “moral history” sounds ideal.

Politics

And that leads us to politics. When it comes to many of the philosophers in this book, it is democracy that seems to win the day among our many political choices -- albeit a very rarefied kind of democracy.

Democracy is the most reasonable form of government; for in it “every one submits to the control of authority over his actions, but not over his judgment and reason; i.e., seeing that all cannot think alike, the voice of the majority has the force of law.” The military basis of this democracy should be universal military service, the citizens retaining their arms during peace; its fiscal basis should be the single tax. The defect of democracy is its tendency to put mediocrity into power; and there is no way of avoiding this except by limiting office to men of “trained skill.” Numbers by themselves cannot produce wisdom, and may give the best favors of office to the grossest flatterers. “The fickle disposition of the multitude almost reduced those who have experience of it to despair; for it is governed solely by emotions, and not by reason.” Thus, democratic government becomes a procession of brief-lived demagogues, and men of worth are loath to enter lists where they must be judged and rated by their inferiors. Sooner or later the more capable men rebel against such a system, though they be in a minority. “Hence I think it is that democracies change into aristocracies, and these at length into monarchies”; people at least prefer tyranny to chaos. Equality of power is an unstable condition; men are by nature unequal; and “he who seeks equality between unequals seeks an absurdity.” Democracy has still to solve the problem of enlisting the best energies of men while giving to all alike the choice of those, among the trained and fit, by whom they wish to be ruled.

Among the trained and fit. These are Spinoza’s words, but they echo similar passages written by Plato and Aristotle before him. Philosophers of many stripes seem to have landed on the idea of “checked” democracy as the ideal political system.

But on another level, it may not really matter which political system one is forced to live under. Force, and its use, after all, tends to blur all the distinctions.

The great evil of the state is its tendency to become an engine of war, a hostile fist shaken in the face of a supposedly inferior world. Santayana thinks that no people has ever won a war.

“Where parties and governments are bad, as they are in most ages and countries, it makes practically no difference to a community, apart from local ravages, whether its own army or the enemy’s is victorious in war. … The private citizen in any event continues in such countries to pay a maximum of taxes and to suffer, in all his private interests, a maximum of vexation and neglect. Nevertheless … the oppressed subject will glow like the rest with patriotic ardor, and will decry as dead to duty and honor anyone who points out how perverse is this helpless allegiance to a government representing no public interest.”

This is strong language for a philosopher; but let us have our Santayana unexpurgated. Often enough, he thinks, conquest and absorption by a larger state is a step forward toward the organization and pacification of mankind; it would be a boon to all the world if all the world were ruled by some great power or group of powers, as all the world was once ruled by Rome, first with the sword and then with the word.

It is an idea worth developing. As I heard a libertarian friend once say, what does it matter which group of criminals taxes us? And to extend that thought -- which is better, a bunch of small criminals, using their citizens in an eternal fight for dominance, or one large criminal, taking his due, but otherwise leaving all citizens in peace?

Santayana continues, again leading us back to where we started:

What form of society, then, shall we strive for? Perhaps for none; there is not much difference among them. But if for any one in particular, for “timocracy.” This would be government by men of merit and honor; it would be an aristocracy, but not hereditary; every man and woman would have an open road according to ability, to the highest offices in the state; but the road would be closed to incompetence, no matter how richly furnished it might be with plebiscites. “The only equality subsisting would be equality of opportunity.” Under such a government corruption would be at a minimum, and science and the arts would flourish through discriminating encouragement. It would be just that synthesis of democracy and aristocracy which the world pines for in the midst of its political chaos today: only the best would rule; but every man would have an equal chance to make himself worthy to be numbered among the best. -- It is, of course, Plato over again, the philosopher-kings of the Republic appearing inevitably on the horizon of every far-seeing political philosophy. The longer we think about these matters the more surely we return to Plato. We need no new philosophy; we need only the courage to live up to the oldest and the best.

Esthetics

The only piece of esthetics I found worth noting is this bit from Schopenhauer.

This deliverance of knowledge from servitude to the will, this forgetting of the individual self and its material interest, this elevation of the mind to the will-less contemplation of truth, is the function of art.

Very much the same Schopenhauer I stumbled across in The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art.

Epilogue

I’ve occasionally stumbled across historical anecdotes that seem to beg me to write them up a short stories. To date, I’ve only acted on one of those entreaties -- when stumbling across the anecdote of Teddy Roosevelt’s fevered brush with death on his expedition up South America’s River of Doubt -- but others probably loom somewhere in my future. Here’s another to add to that list.

[Voltaire] was now eighty-three; and a longing came over him to see Paris before he died. The doctors advised him not to undertake so arduous a trip; but “if I want to commit a folly,” he answered, “nothing will prevent me”; he had lived so long, and worked so hard, that perhaps he felt he had a right to die in his own way, and in that electric Paris from which he had been so long exiled. And so he went, weary mile after weary mile, across France; and when his coach entered the capital his bones hardly held together. He went at once to the friend of his youth, d’Argental: “I have left off dying to come and see you,” he said. The next day his room was stormed by three hundred visitors, who welcomed him as a king; Louis XVI fretted with jealousy. Benjamin Franklin was among the callers, and brought his grandson for Voltaire’s blessing; the old man put his thin hands upon the youth’s head and bade him dedicate himself to “God and Liberty.”

Wow. Just imagine the scene. Poor Richard’s grandson, shaking hands with Voltaire, the bridge from European to American enlightenment encapsulated in this one small human gesture. That’s a story worth writing.

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This post first appeared on Eric Lanke's blog, an association executive and author. You can follow him on Twitter @ericlanke or contact him at eric.lanke@gmail.com.

Monday, November 23, 2020

Dragons - Chapter 50 (DRAFT)

The rest of the conference day went pretty much like that. Something would happen and it would be bad and I would feel like the world was about to crash down all around me. Then something else would happen and it would be good and I would feel like I had redeemed myself in the eyes of all the ever-watchful judges. And then something else would happen and it would be bad again and I would feel like I was back in the soup. To borrow a term, it was bipolar, but that’s what working that conference was like. You were juggling more balls that you had ever juggled before and surviving on four hours of sleep a night.

The truth, of course, is that everything -- the good and the bad and everything in between -- was all in your sleep-deprived mind. No one was watching what you were doing. They were all too busy juggling their own balls.

I had a few spare moments before having to babysit the evening sessions, so I went back to my hotel room to use the restroom and splash some water on my face. There were plenty of restrooms in the convention space, of course, but they were always full of conference goers, and sometimes I just needed a break from all their questions and demands. I’ve been accosted in the men’s room before, attendees recognizing me or my staff badge and deciding the urinals were a great place to lodge their complaints. Really? Can’t you even wait until I’m done peeing?

Before relieving myself I fished my phone out of my pocket I saw that I had a text waiting. I flipped it open I saw that it was from Jenny.

Quest Partners. 617-345-8721. Call Pamela Thornsby.

I looked at my watch. It was 5:37 PM. Florida was the same time zone as Boston so there was a chance that Pamela might still be in the office.

“Hello, this is Pamela Thornsby.”

“Hello, Pamela. This is Alan Larson calling.”

“Alan! How are you? Your wife said you were working a conference this week?”

“Yes,” I said, her voice and the pressure in my bladder suddenly reminding me of how badly I had had to urinate the last time I spoke to Pamela Thornsby, and how badly I thought I had screwed up her interview. “I’m in Miami Beach.”

“Lovely! I hope you’re finding a few moments to enjoy yourself.”

“It’s been pretty busy,” I said, “but I wanted to make sure I returned your call.”

“I’m glad you did. Listen, we’d like to bring you out to Boston soon to meet with the members of our Search Committee. Would you be able to do that sometime shortly after you get back from your conference?”

“I think so,” I said, already moving out of the bathroom. “Let me look at my calendar.”

“We’d be looking for about four hours of you time,” Pamela said as I found my briefcase and pulled my calendar out. “Either a morning or an afternoon. Whatever works best for you.”

“Uh huh,” I said, flipping pages until I found the right week. “It looks like next week Thursday and Friday are fairly clear. But I haven’t looked at any flights yet.”

“Well,” Pamela said, “we can accommodate almost any itinerary you can set up for next week Thursday or Friday, so why don’t you look into flights and email me all the details when you have them.”

“I’ll do that,” I said, flipping my calendar closed and stuffing it back into my briefcase. I should have peed before calling her, I realized belatedly.

“Email me a copy of your receipt for the airfare, too. Quest Partners will reimburse you for the expense.”

“That’s great,” I said quickly.

“And if your itinerary requires an overnight stay, let me know that, too. We can book a reservation for you at the closest hotel.”

“Okay,” I said. “Will do.”

“All right, then, Alan,” Pamela said, her voice signalling that she was about finished with her business. “I’ll watch for the next message from you. If you have any questions, don’t hesitate to call.”

“I will.” Questions? Did I have any questions? “Thanks.”

“Good luck at your conference. We’ll see you next week.”

I might have said good-bye, I might not have. There were suddenly so many things flying through my mind I would never be sure. The line clicked off and I was alone with those thoughts.

Where in Boston was Quest Partners? Would I have to rent a car? How many people were on the Search Committee? Who were they? What questions were they going to ask me? Should I bring anything? What should I wear? Was I going to wet my pants? How badly was I going to screw up this time?

I didn’t have long to stew, nor even to pee. I hadn’t even dropped my phone back into my pocket before it rang again. Looking down at the tiny screen, I could see that it was Mary calling.

“Hello?”

“Alan?”

“Yes?”

“Where are you?”

“I’m in my hotel room.”

Mary paused. Then slowly, “Is everything okay?”

“Yes,” I said. “I’m just freshening up.”

“Are you coming down to the evening sessions?”

“Of course.”

“Okay. Eleanor and I would like to talk to you.”

Fuck. “Where are you?”

“We’re outside the junior ballroom.” Where you’re supposed to be. “Can you meet us soon?”

“Yes. Give me five minutes.” Or ten. I really had to go.

“Okay.”

This time I was sure I didn’t say good-bye. Neither did Mary.

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“Dragons” is a work of fiction. Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are either the products of the author's imagination or used in a fictitious manner. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, or actual events is purely coincidental. For more information, go here.

This post first appeared on Eric Lanke's blog, an association executive and author. You can follow him on Twitter @ericlanke or contact him at eric.lanke@gmail.com.

Image Source
http://lres.com/heres-why-amcs-need-to-pay-close-attention-to-looming-regulatory-changes/businessman-in-the-middle-of-a-labyrinth/



Monday, November 16, 2020

The Enemy of the People by Jim Acosta

I don’t envy members of the White House press corps. Things move so quickly in our current environment that today’s headline is often tomorrow’s forgotten story.

That was one of my primary reactions in reading this book by CNN’s chief White House correspondent. Published in June 2019, it describes many events that occurred in President Donald Trump’s first two years in office -- many of which I had either forgotten about entirely, or for which many of their relevant details were only roughly sketched out in my mind.

Of course, there’s no discussion of impeachment in this book. That drama didn’t enter the public consciousness until September 2019. And that reality creates another kind of challenge for me. As I type these characters, it is December 20, 2019, a few days after the House of Representatives formally impeached President Trump. And given the tremendous backlog of posts I have for this blog, you’re not likely to be reading these words until sometime after November 21, 2020. What all has happened since Acosta stopped writing his book and I started writing this post? And what all will happen after I stop writing this post and before it gets posted on my blog? If the narrative pace of The Enemy of the People is any indication -- the answer to both questions is: quite a lot, indeed.

But, nevermind. Onward. Here’s an event that happened in August 2017 that already seems like a distant memory. As Acosta describes it:

Two days later, on August 14, Trump tried again. Stung by the intense criticism he had received in response to his remarks immediately following the violence in Charlottesville, he addressed the nation. I was in the pool that day, as it was CNN’s day to represent the TV networks. The press gathered in the Diplomatic Room of the White House, where we awaited the president’s latest comments. The story, of course, was whether Trump would strongly condemn the white supremacists behind the melee in Charlottesville, as he should have done from the very beginning. Reading from prepared remarks, he did just that:

“Racism is evil. And those who cause violence in its name are criminals and thugs, including the KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other hate groups that are repugnant to everything we hold dear as Americans,” he said to the nation.

I hope you remember the event that I’m focusing on here. Because Trump’s management of it is emblematic of his presidency and both those who support and oppose him.

Later in the day, Trump held a separate event where he called for an investigation into Chinese trade practices. Still in the pool for that afternoon, I asked him about the contrast between his remarks from earlier in the day and his initial response to what had happened in Charlottesville over the weekend.

“Can you explain why you did not condemn those hate groups by name over the weekend,” I asked.

“They’ve been condemned. They have been condemned,” he replied.

They were. In the scripted press conference the president held earlier in the day, but not in his comments immediately following the event. That’s the source of the confusion.

I then followed up and asked why he wasn’t holding a press conference on Monday, as he had promised that previous Friday, before the events in Charlottesville.

“We just had a press conference,” he answered.

“Could we ask you some more questions?” I inquired.

“It doesn’t bother me at all, but I like real news, not fake news,” he said, and then pointed at me. “You’re fake news.”

“Mr. President, haven’t you spread a lot of fake news yourself, sir?” I responded.

Ah, the old “fake news” line. It was back. I’ve learned that’s become one of his “tells.” Like a poker player, Trump has a tell, giving away what kind of hand he’s holding. If he’s screaming about “fake news,” he’s almost always losing. And he was losing on Charlottesville. Trump clearly didn’t like the fact that he had been compelled by his advisers to revise his botched response to Charlottesville. That was as bad, in his view, as admitting a mistake. And in Trumpworld, as I’ve been told time and again by his advisers, you don’t admit mistakes. You double down on everything, even the stuff you did wrong.

This comment has such explanatory power. If you’re ever confused about Trump’s actions, this simple rule may be as close to a rosetta stone as you’re ever going to get. No matter what happens, never admit you did anything wrong. Combine that with the mixed messages that came out around the Charlottesville event, and you can begin to understand why it -- like many of the things he does -- was so polarizing.

Which brings us to his third crack at commenting on the events in Charlottesville, this time at Trump Tower in Manhattan. Trump had traveled to his office tower and residence in the city to meet with some of the top officials in his administration about the need to upgrade the nation’s infrastructure. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao, Office of Management and Budget director Mick Mulvaney, Trump’s chief economic adviser, Gary Cohn, and a new member of the team, Chief of Staff John Kelly (who had just replaced Reince Priebus), were all in attendance.

After what had occurred the day before, I traveled up to New York with the hunch that Trump would not be able to help himself and would dive back into the Charlottesville issue. As we had so often during the campaign, we gathered in the gold-plated lobby of Trump Tower to await Trump. It felt like old times. (It should be noted that his aides told us in advance that he wouldn’t take any questions.) Trump came down the elevator, made some remarks about his hopes for an infrastructure bill, and before he could turn to exit the lobby, a question on Charlottesville was shouted his way by my NBC colleague Hallie Jackson, and we were off to the races.

It’s often that way with President Trump, especially in the first two years of his presidency. He seemed both unable to control his encounters with the press and to enjoy the verbal sparring that inevitably came about. Acosta refers to this dynamic frequently in his book. Falling off script, thinking we could win an argument, even when it is stacked against him, was one of Trump’s hallmark temptations.

It is still stunning to read the president’s remarks from that day. As of this writing, remarkably, they remain on the official White House website. In them, Trump returned to blaming both sides for the violence in Charlottesville. And that’s when I jumped in, mainly because I couldn’t believe what I was hearing.

TRUMP: Yes, I think there’s blame on both sides. If you look at both sides -- I think there’s blame on both sides. And I have no doubt about it, and you don’t have any doubt about it either. And if you reported it accurately, you would say.

ACOSTA: The neo-Nazis started this. They showed up in Charlottesville to protest---

TRUMP: Excuse me, excuse me. They didn’t put themselves -- and you had some very bad people in that group, but you also had people that were very fine people, on both sides. You had people in that group.

ACOSTA: No, sir, there are no fine people in the Nazis.

As you may have noticed, I didn’t put my questions in question form. That wasn’t necessary in this case, and here’s why. I suppose I could have asked him, “Sir, isn’t it true that there aren’t any fine people in the Nazis?” But that would have suggested that this notion was open to debate. I’m sorry, but there aren’t two sides when it comes to Nazis. I think we have reached the point where we can state, definitively, that Nazis are bad people. It kind of goes without saying. But I will: If you are a Nazi, you aren’t a fine person. You’re bad. So, yes, I felt well within the safe bounds of reporting to state back to the president “there are no fine people in the Nazis.” When it’s a matter of right versus wrong, there are not two sides of the story.

I agree with Acosta. I agree with both his statements that there are no fine people in the Nazis and that when it’s a matter of right versus wrong, there are not two sides of the story. But, I still wish he would’ve asked the president, “Sir, isn’t it true that there aren’t any fine people in the Nazis?” If he had, one of two things would’ve happened. Trump would have either disagreed, and gone on to argue unequivocally that some Nazis are very fine people, or he would have clarified, as I think he believed, that not everybody marching in Charlottesville was a Nazi. That might’ve created some needed granularity in everyone’s interpretation of what was going on.

Acosta, however, wasn’t thinking that way. His next several paragraphs illuminate a different, but still very serious battle, that he was fighting.

There’s another point to be made here, one going back to the idea that a different kind of president requires a different kind of press. If a president is trying to bully his way through some tough questions, interrupting and shouting, “Excuse me, excuse me,” what do you, as a reporter, do? This is when it’s probably time to throw out the old rulebook. Trump was likely not going to candidly volunteer a comment that there are “very fine people” on both sides had I not challenged him. Sometimes the sparring he craves can be his own undoing; that’s when he often shows who he really is. And at that bizzare news conference at Trump Tower, that’s exactly what he did.

In responding to Trump’s attacks, my thinking is you have to be measured and choose the right moment. Opinions vary as to whether I have met that standard, but there are very clear moments when challenging a president’s thinking is the right choice. Who am I to judge when his thought process goes off the deep end? I think that’s fairly obvious. Whether it’s an attack on the press or a blatant lie about policy or a betrayal of American principles (e.g., that Nazis are the scum of the earth), a more restrained reaction from a reporter sets a precedent that what had been said is now acceptable in our democracy. The same goes for the president’s unrelenting assault on journalists in America. Yes, Trump’s attacks on the press are designed, for the moment, to elicit a response. And yes, that response excites parts of his base. And yes, the Trump people sit back and say, “See? It works.” And yes, some news editors say, “See, that’s why we shouldn’t respond.” But Trump’s apologists and propagandists are going to go on the attack and make our lives miserable no matter what we report. That’s what they do. If we tailor our coverage to appease them, we’ve already lost. Their reaction shouldn’t change the essential calculus that attacks on the press, if left unanswered, are just going to get worse. So the question becomes: do you take the bait or take the knife?

More often than not, I opt for the bait, which bothers some people -- both in the media and in the White House. But to those critics, I ask: does every president lie and attack the press as Trump does? No. As new presidents come along and return a state of normalcy to dealings with the news media, will there be as great a need to stand up for ourselves? Of course not. Playbooks for individual journalists and news organizations will be adjusted accordingly, as we will no longer be under attack.

This, obviously, is where the title of Acosta’s book comes from. “The enemy of the people” is a phrase used by the president to describe the “mainstream media,” which he believes is biased against him and against the views of conservative Americans. I think it’s important for the media to push back against this kind of treatment, as Acosta describes, and more than that, I even think it’s time for them to drop the pretense of fairness and go back to reporting what they think is right and what they think is wrong. But that’s a subject for another day. My larger fear, however, is that Acosta is being too optimistic about returning to some kind of normalcy after the Trump presidency. As loath as I am to admit it, I think the Trump view of our politics, even the parts that give rise to “the enemy of the people” comments, are here with us to stay, regardless of who the next president is.

But let’s get back to Charlottesville.

After our exchange about “very fine people” that day in Trump Tower, Trump then tried to change to subject back to the grievance that drew the Unite the Right protesters to Charlottesville in the first place, the removal of the statue of Robert E. Lee. When it came to sides, guess which one Trump chose? The president said in all seriousness that somehow George Washington would be next, as if federal workers would dismantle the Washington Monument.

TRUMP: Excuse me, excuse me. I saw the same pictures as you did. You had people in that group that were there to protest the taking down of, to them, a very, very important statue and the renaming of a park from Robert E. Lee to another name.

ACOSTA: George Washington and Robert E. Lee are not the same.

TRUMP: George Washington was a slave owner. Was George Washington a slave owner? So will George Washington now lose his statue? Are we going to take down -- Excuse me, are we going to take down statues to George Washington? How about Thomas Jefferson? What do you think of Thomas Jefferson? You like him?

A few moments after that “very fine people” comment, Trump tried to clean up his mess by adding a bit of a disclaimer. “I’m not talking about the neo-Nazis and the white nationalists, because they should be condemned totally,” he said. “But you had many people in the group other than neo-Nazis and white nationalists, okay? And the press has treated them absolutely unfairly.”

As I said previously, in Trump’s mind, the “very fine people” comment was not directed at the white supremacists who led the protest, but other (perhaps imaginary) people in the crowd who were not neo-Nazis nor white nationalists, but who had come to protest the removal of a statue represented what they viewed as an American hero.

But whether or not Trump was serious about this nuanced point, he definitely wasn’t serious about his comparison between George Washington and Robert E. Lee. In making that comparison, I believe, Trump was yet again engaging in one of his favorite rhetorical devices, what others have called “whataboutism.” Oh yeah? Well, what about [insert someone the person you’re arguing with holds in esteem]? He did the same thing as [the person I’m defending]. Whataboutism isn’t about rational, reasoned debate. Its purpose is to create confusion and false equivalency in people’s minds, and its use is very intentional. Trump doesn’t actually think George Washington is the same as Robert E. Lee. Trump simply wants Acosta to entertain the possibility that George Washington might be the same as Robert E. Lee so that he can undercut Acosta’s argument.

But, relative to how the president handled this event, Acosta makes an even more important point.

The president’s defenders like to point to this final comment as an exoneration of his performance on Charlottesville. I call bullshit. In my view, a president of the United States should get this right the first time. It shouldn’t take four or five (or whatever number we are on) tries to get it right. Within a matter of four days, Trump had equivocated on the violence in Charlottesville, reversed himself to condemn the fascists, only to pull another about-face on the issue, basically landing where he started, essentially siding with the white nationalists who had touched off the violence. The epic fail at Trump Tower was written all over John Kelly’s face as the chief of staff hung his head in full view of the cameras.

I’ve gone at length on this particular excerpt because I think it is illustrative, both of the tone of Acosta’s book, and the way this president and the press he hates keep talking past each other. There’s a lot to learn from both illustrations, both for the people of this republic and for future presidents.

Let me close with two other penetrating observations from Acosta’s book. First...

Portions of the GOP, it seemed, were willing to compromise themselves in favor of achieving long-term party goals. If you wanted your tax cuts, you had to swallow Trump’s highly questionable behavior. Same thing if you wanted conservative judges. Trump and the Republicans may not believe in compromising with Democrats, but there was compromising going on inside their own party. They were horse trading, all right. The party was achieving a few of its policy goals in exchange for looking the other way.

I think this is spot on, and it is the same dynamic I see among my own friends and colleagues with a track record of voting Republican. They don’t like Trump. But they like what the Republicans have been able to do since he came into office. As long as they had the presidency, the House, and the Senate, they could do as they wished legislatively. And now, as long as they have the presidency and the Senate, they can do as they wish in terms of judicial appointments. For the party and its partisans, that’s what matters most.

And second, with regard to the domestic abuse scandal surrounding personal staff secretary to the president, Rob Porter…

The code of ethics of the Trump White House had revealed itself yet again, as the president fell back into a familiar pattern. When it comes to allegations of sexual misconduct, Trump almost always stands with the accused and not the accuser. He had done this before; he would do it again. Speaking to reporters, Trump expressed sympathy for his former staff secretary, noting that Porter had proclaimed his innocence.

“He also, as you probably know, says he’s innocent and I think you have to remember that,” Trump said. “He said very strongly yesterday that he’s innocent so you have to talk to him about that, but we absolutely wish him well, he did a very good job when he was at the White House.”

That statement, siding with Porter, was another reminder of just how Trump didn’t seem to understand the president’s role of providing moral leadership in a situation like this. This would not have been tolerated at a Fortune 500 company, and yet it was happening at the White House.

There’s one thing that the Trump presidency has made clear to me -- and that is how important it is for presidents to bring people together rather than split them apart. I think Acosta understands that, too, and that represents a deep measure of the distrust that exists between Trump and the press corps. Trump’s natural tendency is to take sides, so much so that every interaction and every kind is hardcoded into immutable “us’s” and “them’s”.

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This post first appeared on Eric Lanke's blog, an association executive and author. You can follow him on Twitter @ericlanke or contact him at eric.lanke@gmail.com.


Monday, November 9, 2020

Dragons - Chapter 49 (DRAFT)

When the keynote session was over, close to two thousand people had to get themselves out of the ballroom and off to their chosen lunch activity. For a great majority of them, that meant attending one of the twenty lunch sessions that we had planned as part of the conference schedule. These were highly coveted opportunities, both for the meal provided, but also for the small, discussion-based nature of the activity. We’d recruit in a recognized expert in one of twenty topic areas and limit attendance to no more than twenty participants, all in an attempt to preserve an environment where a kind of roundtable discussion could take place.

Twenty sessions of twenty people each meant that only 400 people could be accommodated, leaving 1,600 or more to fend for themselves, seeking lunch in one of the hotel outlets, nearby restaurants or food trucks, or hospitality functions organized by the exhibitors. With so many people heading off in so many different directions, the foyer outside the ballroom frequently resembled a busy subway platform, and through the years we had come to understand the value of placing staff members at strategic flow points to serve as guideposts and gatekeepers.

“Where’s the session with Dr. Maplethorpe!” one conference-goer shouted at me as she quickly approached, seemingly pulled along more by the current of bodies than her own volition.

“Up one level and down the hall to the left!” I shouted back, pointing towards a flight of escalators where a bottleneck was already forming.

Like a lot of the staff, I enjoyed complaining about the herd mentality that possessed otherwise intelligent people in these circumstances. To control access to the twenty lunch sessions they were ticketed, with each ticket costing the ticket holder forty dollars in addition to the conference registration fee they had already paid. This caused a lot of grousing, the average conference attendee oblivious to the fact that the lunches that came out of hotel banquet kitchens could easily cost forty dollars or more. On each ticket, which we painstakingly stuffed in the registration envelopes each attendee received at the start of the conference, we printed all the information they could possibly need about the session they were attending. The day, the time, the room location, the session number, the session title, the discussion leader -- they were all there in their laser-printed glory. And, if anyone cared to turn the little piece of cardboard over, they would see a miniature reproduction of the appropriate floor of the convention hotel, where some underappreciated human being had actually affixed a small red star in the box that represented the session’s room location.

But no one, it seemed, looked at these tickets, or tried to decipher the curious markings they contained. Why bother? When it was so much simpler just to shout “Where’s the session with Dr. Maplethorpe!” at the nearest idiot wearing a staff badge?

I and four other staff people served in this capacity for fifteen minutes or more, and, when the flow of people out of the ballroom slowed to a trickle, we all rushed off to our next assignments. The lunch sessions would be starting in another ten minutes or so, and we had to make sure the rooms, discussion leaders, and participants had everything they needed. With five staff people and twenty sessions, we had each been assigned four rooms to monitor. My four were down the same hallway as those assigned to Caroline Abernathy, and when I turned into the corridor I saw her engaged in a heated argument with an attendee.

“Get out of my way!” the attendee, who I could only see from behind -- a man in a wrinkled sport coat with frizzy white hair -- was shouting at Caroline, who stood, along with the redcoat we had hired to collect the session tickets, in the doorway of the room.

“I’m sorry, sir,” Caroline said, her voice a strange kind of shaky calm, “this session is for ticket holders only. Do you have a ticket?”

“NO I DON’T HAVE A TICKET!” the man shouted.

Both Caroline and the elderly redcoat who could have been her grandmother seemed to tremble under buffeting winds of his angry voice.

Knowing there was nothing I could do that Caroline wasn’t already doing, but wanting to take some of the pressure off her young shoulders, I stepped into the fray.

“Can I help you, sir?”

The man whirled like he was in a street fight. “What? Who the hell are you?”

His appearance gave me a momentary pause. I recognized him, and it took me half a second to remember from where. He wasn’t wearing the Pink Panther tie he had been wearing the last time I saw him, but it was the same guy. The goofball that had tried to derail Eleanor’s chosen speaker at the leadership meeting I had attended earlier in the year. I looked at his name badge, hanging from a string of Mardi Gras beads around his neck. Roger Rockhammer.

I told him my name and my title, and then took him by the elbow to try and steer him out of the flow of traffic that was still trying to get down the hallway to the other lunch sessions.

He shrugged me off. “Get your hand off of me!” he shouted. “Now, you listen to me. I came all the way from New Mexico to attend this session, and you’re not keeping me out of it.”

“But, Mr. Rockhammer,” I said as politely as I could. “This session requires a ticket and you didn’t purchase one.”

“I’ll buy one now,” he said, reaching for and producing a wallet that, I kid you not, had a cloth decal of the Tasmanian Devil stitched on it.

“The session is already sold out,” I told him, not bothering to check that fact with either Caroline or her grandmother. All the lunch sessions were always sold out.

“But there are empty seats in there!” he pleaded, his arm shooting out to indicate the interior of the session room and almost hitting Caroline in the forehead.

I instinctively looked into the room and saw the expected conference table set for twenty, the ensemble practically filling the small meeting room, with perhaps fifteen or sixteen people sitting shoulder to shoulder in fifteen or sixteen of the chairs, some already munching on a salad that a beleaguered banquet captain struggled to place in front of each. None of that surprised me. Not the tight set and not the handful of empty chairs. What did surprise me was the person who was sitting at the very head of the table, in the position typically reserved for the session’s discussion leader.

It was Eleanor Rumford. She was sitting there, silent and unmoving, a fork in one hand, but her salad as yet undisturbed. For a heart-stopping moment, her eyes locked with mine, and I knew what I had to do.

“Mr. Rockhammer,” I said, turning back to him. “I’m very sorry, but this session is sold out and those seats are reserved for ticket holders.”

He quickly inhaled and opened his mouth, but I raised my voice and rushed into my next sentence.

“No, I’m sorry. I’m going to have to ask you to leave this session before you create a disturbance.”

His face turned red with the insult, but before he could sputter another protest, another attendee approached from my right. As if I had pre-arranged it, he held up a ticket and I took it from him while Caroline stepped slightly away from the doorway to allow him into the room.

“There, you see,” I said. “Ticket holders are still arriving. Every chair will be full in the next few minutes. Now, really,” I said, taking him more firmly by the elbow, “why don’t we go down to the registration desk and see if we can accommodate you in one of tomorrow’s sessions.”

“I came here to attend this session!” Rockhammer cried, but offered no other resistance to my coaxing. In a moment I had him moving back down the hall, and a moment after that we were on the escalator together, practically alone in going down while a swarm of people were still jostling each other to go up in single file. When his legs stopped moving his lips started moving again. He protested the treatment he was receiving, loudly, I thought, more for the benefit of the friends and colleagues he might be passing on the escalator than out of any true sense of injustice.

I let him have his say, standing as stoically as I could on the escalator step just above him. We were moving in the right direction, after all, and I suspected that I might have already scored the necessary point. Down the upstairs hallway, in a small and cramped meeting room without any windows, I could imagine Eleanor Rumford starting her session, pleased that someone had delivered her from contact with her boorish nemesis.

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“Dragons” is a work of fiction. Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are either the products of the author's imagination or used in a fictitious manner. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, or actual events is purely coincidental. For more information, go here.

This post first appeared on Eric Lanke's blog, an association executive and author. You can follow him on Twitter @ericlanke or contact him at eric.lanke@gmail.com.

Image Source
http://lres.com/heres-why-amcs-need-to-pay-close-attention-to-looming-regulatory-changes/businessman-in-the-middle-of-a-labyrinth/



Monday, November 2, 2020

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance by Robert M. Pirsig

This is one of those books that everyone has heard of, but few have actually read -- at least few born after 1980. And maybe that’s a good thing. For me, it was a frustrating read.

You go through a heavy industrial area of a large city and there it all is, the technology. In front of it are high barbed-wire fences, locked gates, signs saying NO TRESPASSING, and beyond, through sooty air, you see ugly strange shapes of metal and brick whose purpose is unknown, and whose master you will never see. What it’s for you don’t know, and why it’s there, there’s no one to tell, and so all you can feel is alienated, estranged, as though you didn’t belong there. Who owns and understands this doesn’t want you around. All this technology has somehow made you a stranger in your own land. Its very shape and appearance and mysteriousness say, “Get out.” You know there’s an explanation for all this somewhere and what it’s doing undoubtedly serves mankind in some indirect way but that isn’t what you see. What you see is the NO TRESPASSING, KEEP OUT signs and not anything serving people but little people, like ants, serving these strange, incomprehensible shapes. And you think, even if I were a part of this, even if I were not a stranger, I would be just another ant serving the shapes. So the final feeling is hostile, and I think that’s ultimately what’s involved with this otherwise unexplainable attitude of John and Sylvia. Anything to do with valves and shafts and wrenches is a part of that dehumanized world, and they would rather not think about it. They don’t want to get into it.

John and Sylvia are a couple that our author goes on cross-country motorcycle adventures with. The author here is noodling on their apparent hostility to the mechanics of the machines that carry them around the country, and is obviously trying to make it symptomatic of a larger societal trend -- away from the human and towards the machine as the center of our philosophic life.

That’s well and good. But this is where the frustration begins for me. Because when the author talks about technology, he’s talking about the industrial technology of another time. And although his book was published in 1974, when he waxes against technology like this, I have a hard time not envisioning the technology of turn-of-the-20th-century dystopian epics like Metropolis. I can almost hear the Giorgio Moroder music playing.

And that really leaves me flat. So even though he talks a lot about the isolating effects of technology...

Technology is blamed for a lot of this loneliness, since the loneliness is certainly associated with the newer technological devices -- TV, jets, freeways and so on -- but I hope it’s been made plain that the real evil isn’t the objects of technology but the tendency of technology to isolate people into lonely attitudes of objectivity. It’s the objectivity, the dualistic way of looking at things underlying technology, that produces the evil. That’s why I went to so much trouble to show how technology could be used to destroy the evil. A person who knows how to fix motorcycles -- with Quality -- is less likely to run short of friends than one who doesn’t. And they aren’t going to see him as some kind of object either. Quality destroys objectivity every time.

...he seems to be speaking about another time -- a time in which humans still had a predisposition to objective dualism between themselves and their technology. In the late 2010s, after social media and smartphones have effectively reprogrammed our brains, I’m not sure humans still see themselves as separate from and hostile to their technology.

What he complains about with regard to Aristotle...

What I find in Aristotle is mainly a quite dull collection of generalizations, many of which seem impossible to justify in the light of modern knowledge, whose organization appears extremely poor, and which seems primitive in the way old Greek pottery in the museums seems primitive.

...is exactly how I feel about him and his ideas. Through long sections of the book, which he unironically frames as his own Chautauqua, the modern reader has to patiently wait for the author to come to conclusions that philosophers much more ancient than him have already reached and moved past.

If the purpose of scientific method is to select from among a multitude of hypotheses, and if the number of hypotheses grows faster than experimental method can handle, then it is clear that all hypotheses can never be tested. If all hypotheses cannot be tested, then the results of any experiment are inconclusive and the entire scientific method falls short of its goal of establishing proven knowledge.

About this Einstein had said, “Evolution has shown that at any given moment out of all conceivable constructions a single one has always proved itself absolutely superior to the rest,” and let it go at that. But to Phaedrus that was an incredibly weak answer. The phrase “at any given moment” really shook him. Did Einstein really mean to state that truth was a function of time? To state that would annihilate the most basic presumption of all science!

But there it was, the whole history of science, a clear story of continuously new and changing explanations of old facts. The time spans of permanence seemed completely random, he could see no order in them. Some scientific truths seemed to last for centuries, others for less than a year. Scientific truth was not dogma, good for eternity, but a temporal quantitative entity that could be studied like anything else.

The Phaedrus mentioned above is not the fictional character from Plato’s dialogue. It is instead the alter ego of the author himself. We eventually come to learn that the author was once a professor of philosophy for whom these mental meanderings became so shattering to his sense of identity and permanence that his personality split and his world fell apart. The motorcycle trip that he is on -- and during which he is evidently writing his Chautauqua -- is an attempt to pick up the pieces and repair the breach.

But to me, with no wish to diminish his real suffering, the author’s journey to nihilism and back is tedious and boring. Again and again while reading his text, I found myself scribbling in the margins comments like: “I’m sorry that you started with the false understanding that the world is permanent. But just because the revelation that it is not shatters your fragile ego, it does not mean that others have not comfortably built their own stability in what you now call chaos.”

And when he starts talking about Zen, the Buddha, and Quality, he frankly loses me entirely. The most salient piece of wisdom in the book comes long before those complications. It goes like this:

Man tries to make for himself in the fashion that suits him best a simplified and intelligible picture of the world. He then tries to some extent to substitute this cosmos of his for the world of experience, and thus to overcome it. … He makes this cosmos and its construction the pivot of his emotional life in order to find in this way the peace and serenity which he cannot find in the narrow whirlpool of personal experience.

And those aren’t even the author’s words. They’re Einstein’s. The world as it is and the world as we perceive it are two different things. That’s the only dualism that matters -- now and forever. For those who wish to lead an examined life, they can either build their castle on those shifting sands, or they can contend that nothing can ever be built, and destroy themselves in the process.

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This post first appeared on Eric Lanke's blog, an association executive and author. You can follow him on Twitter @ericlanke or contact him at eric.lanke@gmail.com.